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This report focuses on the reform of international telecommunications markets, in
particular on the payment arrangements between providers of international
telecommunications services. It examines possible inefficiencies associated with
those arrangements, covers community benefits arising from recent reform and
considers issues relating to future reform.
The Commission has concluded that the broad strategies adopted by Australia in
pursuing international telecommunications reform are appropriate. Key findings are
that:
•  liberalisation of the Australian domestic telecommunications market has been
central to reform of Australia’s international telecommunications sector;
•  similar domestic market liberalisation in other countries is of benefit to
Australia; and
•  Australia should continue to build strong bilateral and regional relationships to
maximise its effectiveness in pursuing telecommunications reform in multilateral
forums.
Background
International telecommunications markets in Australia and many other countries
have been subject to rapid change during the last decade or so due to:
•  regulatory reform aimed at market liberalisation, either unilaterally or under the
auspices of the World Trade  Organization (WTO);
•  rapid technological change which has driven down the underlying costs of
existing services and enabled the provision of new services; and
•  rapid growth in consumer demand, especially for the Internet.
However, not all governments support reform of the traditional payment
arrangements for international telecommunications — their monopoly providers
would face a significant loss of earnings from abroad — and some have been
delaying the reform process. As a result, little has been achieved so far in the
institutional reform of those arrangements.XIV OVERVIEW AND
FINDINGS
Payment arrangements
Traditionally, payment by providers in one country to providers in other countries
for most international telecommunications traffic has taken place under the
accounting rate system. In brief:
•  a per minute rate — the accounting rate — is agreed between a provider in one
country and a provider in another;
•  a settlement rate is then agreed, usually at half of the accounting rate;
•  payment is made by one provider to the other, based on the  balance of the traffic
between them and the agreed settlement rate.
With the developments noted above, the basic premise underlying this system has
lost much relevance. Modern international telecommunications are no longer limited
to jointly provided services by monopolists in each country of a series of bilateral
relationships. They are now traded in many different technical and commercial
ways, often in contestable markets.
Indeed, many countries with liberalised markets have given telecommunications
providers greater freedom than in the past to negotiate payment arrangements on a
commercial basis. Thus, although the accounting rate system remains important on
some routes, prices on many routes are increasingly being determined
commercially. This includes payment for cable or satellite capacity, for
interconnection (origination and termination) services and for the rapidly growing
Internet.
Inefficient pricing
Agreed accounting rates were originally intended to represent the total costs of
international calls, but underlying costs have declined rapidly and the gap between
these costs and the accounting rates has widened. Further, Australia’s total
international outwards traffic under the accounting rate system has significantly
exceeded inwards traffic. Thus, although the relative importance for Australia of the
accounting rate system has declined, Australian providers have had to make
payments to foreign providers for the balance of traffic under the system at rates
which greatly exceed costs.
There is also evidence of inefficient pricing (that is, of prices exceeding underlying
costs) for the services now provided outside the accounting rate system. For
example, access to international cable capacity has at times been difficult to obtain,
and then only at high prices (although this could change with a planned massive
expansion in cable capacity). Charges for interconnection to the local loop continueOVERVIEW AND
FINDINGS
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to significantly exceed underlying costs in some markets, including Australia. For
international Internet traffic, Australian providers at present pay for both inwards
and outwards traffic with the United States.
Competitive conduct and investment behaviour
It is difficult to link the competitive conduct and investment behaviour of
international telecommunications providers directly to the inefficiencies inherent in
past and existing payment systems. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that
providers adopt strategies to minimise the adverse effects of payment systems, and
continue to exploit available market power. The opportunities have been expanded
by the recent liberalisation of telecommunications markets in many countries,
coupled with technological change.
Australian providers seek to minimise costs by, for example:
•  changing the routing of traffic to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities;
•  forming alliances with foreign providers to give an end-to-end service; and
•  investing in facilities in other countries.
Although these strategies can reduce the costs imposed on Australian providers, and
provide some community benefit, greater benefits would be obtained by reform of
the payment arrangements themselves, coupled with further liberalisation of
domestic telecommunications markets.
The competitive conduct of foreign providers could also disadvantage the Australian
community. Here also, continuing liberalisation of telecommunications markets
would bring benefit through reducing opportunities for anti-competitive behaviour.
Benefits from reform
Australia commenced reform of domestic telecommunications as far back as 1975.
Liberalisation progressed much further in July 1997 when a new
telecommunications regulatory regime — intended to promote the long term
interests of end users and the efficiency and international competitiveness of the
Australian telecommunications industry — came into effect. These changes
facilitated competition in the Australian market, and opened up access to foreign
providers.XVI OVERVIEW AND
FINDINGS
Australia has been engaged also in seeking reform through the WTO and the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Some progress has been made, but
further liberalisation of domestic markets and reform of payment systems is needed.
So far, the reform process has brought worthwhile benefits for Australia. These
include reductions in accounting rates and consumer charges, growth in
telecommunications traffic, greater freedom for providers to invest in other
countries and to establish alliances, and a growing supply of international cable
capacity.
Measuring these benefits poses considerable difficulties. However, most of the
revenue loss to Australia from high accounting rates (tentatively estimated at some
$108 million for 1995-96 at the provider level)  may have already been eliminated.
This is mainly because of the marked decline — facilitated by the reform process —
in the relative importance of the accounting rate system for Australian international
telecommunications traffic.
In regard to the possible future benefits from reform, it is noted that:
•  an excess price in the order of 2–3 cents per minute may apply in Australia to
interconnection with  Telstra’s domestic network;
•  on a per minute equivalent basis, an excess price of over 10 cents may apply on
leased lines for international traffic; and
•  in regard to Internet traffic with the United States, Australian providers bear a
total excess cost of about $45–72 million per annum.
Although these estimates may appear small in absolute terms:
•  they are important relative to the size of the international telecommunications
sector;
•  unless matched by price reductions, the potential gains will increase as
underlying costs continue to fall;
•  the estimates do not capture all remaining inefficiencies; and
•  the estimates are based on current traffic volumes. As traffic volumes are
increasing rapidly — for example, Internet traffic is doubling each year — the
potential gains will also increase rapidly.
Further, these estimates are likely to understate the benefits which could be obtained




•  The traditional accounting rate system for international telephony has
significantly declined in importance in recent years. There is increasing scope
for commercial negotiation between providers, with prices determined on the
basis of the services required.
•  Accounting rates for international telecommunications traffic to and from non-
liberalised countries remain well above underlying costs.
-  Australia could increase pressure for reform through negotiation with other
countries in the ITU to extend endorsement of alternative calling procedures
and to seek removal of categories of international traffic, such as that
originating or terminating on mobile networks, from the accounting rate
system.
•  There is evidence of inefficient pricing for some services between liberalised
markets, including the Internet.
-  The relative importance of domestic interconnection in the total costs of
international telecommunications continues to grow. The work of the ACCC
should ultimately result in a better alignment of interconnection prices with
underlying costs.
-  There is a potential anomaly in levying a Universal Service Obligation
contribution on international satellite operators, but not on international cable
consortia.
•  It is difficult to link the market conduct and investment behaviour of
international telecommunications providers directly to the inefficiencies inherent
in past and existing payment systems. There is considerable evidence, however,
that providers adopt strategies that minimise the adverse effects of those systems
and that they continue to exploit remaining market power.
•  While individual providers adopt strategies to reduce the costs imposed on them
by inefficiencies in payment arrangements, greater benefit to the community
would be obtained by reform of the payment arrangements themselves and
further liberalisation of markets.
•  Although the available estimates of the losses arising from inefficiencies in
payment arrangements appear relatively small, they are likely to underestimate
the full benefits which could be obtained from current and future reform.
-  The potential benefits from reform would be more visible if the ACCC
included more services in the scope of its annual public report on
telecommunications charges paid by consumers and also publishedXVIII OVERVIEW AND
FINDINGS
information about the underlying costs making up the elements of
international telecommunications services.
•  The broad strategies adopted by Australia in pursuit of telecommunications
market reform in general, and of reform of international telecommunications
payment arrangements in particular, have been appropriate. They include:
-  liberalising the Australian domestic telecommunications market;
-  pursuing liberalisation of domestic markets of other countries through the
WTO;
-  following through on the commitment of WTO members to take up reform of
the accounting rate system in forthcoming negotiations;
-  seeking a commercially negotiated cost-based pricing approach to
international telecommunications and its various service components,
including originating and terminating interconnection;
-  continuing to seek reform through the ITU;
-  building strong bilateral and regional relationships to maximise Australia’s
effectiveness in multilateral forums; and
-  pursuing reform of Internet charging arrangements in an international context.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Scope of the inquiry
The Commonwealth Government has asked the Commission to inquire into
international telecommunications market regulation. In particular, the Commission
has been asked to report on:
•  the various settlement arrangements which exist and are emerging in the
international telecommunications market;
•  whether international agreements or asymmetric national policies concerning
market structure and conduct give rise to distortions or mispricing of the
settlement arrangements;
•  the competitive conduct and investment behaviour of Australian firms in the
international telecommunications market, both domestically and internationally;
•  community benefits from reform of the settlement arrangements; and
•  options for reform.
The Commission has interpreted ‘settlement arrangements’ broadly to include all
payment arrangements between providers of international telecommunications
services, not just the traditional accounting rate system applying to international
telephone calls.
In undertaking the inquiry, the Commission has been asked to have regard to the
Government’s established economic, social and environmental objectives. In
addition, the Commission’s general policy guidelines require it, amongst other
things, to recognise the interests of the Australian community generally. Thus,
although the inquiry focuses on payment arrangements between providers in relation
to international telecommunications traffic, the effects of those arrangements on
consumers, such as businesses and households, and on the community as a whole
are also relevant.
Aspects of domestic regulation particularly relevant to international
telecommunications are covered in the inquiry.
The terms of reference are set out at the beginning of the report on pages V and VI.
The Commission was asked to submit its final report by 23 August 1999.2 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKET REGULATION
A separate National Bandwidth Inquiry is currently being undertaken by the
Australian Information Economy Advisory Council. The Commission has
endeavoured to minimise duplication of the work of that inquiry, which is due to
report by October 1999.
1.2 The inquiry context
Over the past decade, international telecommunications markets in Australia and in
other countries (such as the United States and the European Union) have been
subject to rapid change.
Market liberalisation
Regulatory reform aimed at achieving market liberalisation has been of major
significance. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 1994 General Agreement
on Trade in Services and the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, many
countries have scheduled commitments to market access (ie the opening of domestic
markets to foreign providers), national treatment (treating domestic and foreign
firms equally) and pro-competitive regulation for ‘basic telecommunications’ (for
more details see section 3.1). This includes voice telephone, telex, telegraph and
private leased circuit services.
For some countries — including the United States, the United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Australia — these agreements lock in existing unilateral reforms. For
others, they imply substantial additional market liberalisation. Box 1.1 provides a
summary of Australia’s reforms and describes the key features of the existing
regulatory arrangements.
Despite progress so far, many countries still have some way to go before their
markets are as liberalised as Australia’s. These countries typically have significant
restrictions on market access, including monopoly supply of services and barriers to
foreign equity in domestic providers. These remaining restrictions are likely to be
addressed in the next round of WTO services negotiations which is due to
commence by 1 January 2000.INTRODUCTION 3
Box 1.1 Regulation of Australia’s telecommunications market
Significant changes to Australia’s telecommunications regulatory environment have
been implemented as far back as 1975 when Telecom was formed out of a
government department, initially with full government ownership and with a statutory
monopoly on the supply of telecommunications services. A number of liberalising
changes were subsequently made, including:
•  corporatisation, giving Telecom (now Telstra) a more commercial focus and
establishing AUSTEL, an independent regulator;
•  increasing competition, first in the form of alternative suppliers of customer
premises equipment and value added services, and later in the network from
Optus, a second licensed network carrier; and
•  privatisation — the domestic satellite operator, AUSSAT, was sold to Optus,
complete with a network licence.
On 1 July 1997, a new telecommunications regulatory regime came into effect in
Australia which is intended to promote the long term interests of end users and the
efficiency and international competitiveness of the telecommunications industry. Key
features of the new regime are as follows.
Carriers and carriage service providers
•  The owner of a network unit used to supply carriage services to the public must
hold a carrier licence granted by the Australian Communications Authority.
•  There is no limit on the number of carrier licences which can be issued. Carrier
licence conditions impose obligations to contribute toward the cost of universal
service obligations, fulfil industry development plans and comply with
telecommunications access regulation.
•  A carriage service provider supplies a telecommunications service to the public
using network facilities owned by a carrier. Carriage service providers are not
required to be licensed, but have many of the same obligations as carriers.
Competition safeguards
•  The telecommunications industry is subject to general competition law specified in
Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974, as well as industry specific rules under
that Act, administered by the ACCC, in relation to anti-competitive conduct and
telecommunications access (see below).
•  The ACCC may issue a competition notice where it considers a carrier or carriage
service provider to be engaging in anti-competitive conduct.
•  Under provisions of the Telecommunications Act 1997, the ACCC may respond to
anti-competitive conduct by international telecommunications operators (see box
4.6).





•  The ACCC may declare services subject to telecommunications access rules.
•  Where services are declared, providers must comply with their access obligations:
on commercially agreed terms and conditions; as detailed in an access
undertaking accepted by the ACCC; or as determined by the ACCC through
arbitration when the parties cannot agree.
•  The Telecommunications Access Forum is required, among other things, to draft
an access code setting out model terms and conditions.
Price control arrangements
Telstra is subject to a number of price control arrangements. For example, under
revised controls taking effect on 1 July 1999, a CPI minus 5.5 per cent price-cap
applies to a basket of eight of Telstra’s services: connections, line rentals, local, trunk
and international calls, domestic and international leased lines and digital cellular
mobile. Other price-caps also apply.
Privatisation of dominant carrier
One-third of the equity in Telstra was sold in 1997, with a further equity sale to be
completed later in 1999. This will bring private ownership to about 49.9 per cent.
Source: DOCITA (website at http://www.dcita.gov.Australia); IC (1997b).
Market-based changes
In addition to these regulatory reforms, there have been significant market-based
changes. Rapid technological change has driven down the underlying costs of
providing telecommunications services, including international telecommunications
services. Examples include the digitalisation of many services (including voice
traffic), optical transmission and the continuing development of compression and
multiplexing techniques. These have enabled the volume of traffic sent along cables
and through satellite systems to be increased many times over.
A second significant market-based change is the rapid growth in consumer demand,
particularly for data services and those provided over the Internet. This growth in
demand has, in turn, sparked investment in new network capacity, for example in
international submarine cables and in satellites.INTRODUCTION 5
Pressures on payment arrangements
Liberalisation of markets, technological change, and growth in demand have
contributed to pressures on the payment arrangements between providers of
international telecommunications services.
The traditional  accounting rate system, in particular, has been under severe
pressure. Under this system:
•  a per minute rate — the accounting rate — is agreed between a provider in
country A and a provider in country B;
•  a settlement rate is then agreed, usually at half the accounting rate; and
•  payment between the providers is based on the  balance of the traffic between
them at the agreed settlement rate.
The system, and the pressures undermining it, are described in more detail in
chapter 3, with its economic effects analysed in chapter 4. A particular problem
with the system is that the agreed rates of payment have been usually well above the
underlying costs of providing international telecommunications.
Many countries with liberalised markets, including Australia, New Zealand, the
United States and the United Kingdom, now permit their telecommunications
providers to negotiate payment terms and conditions on a more commercial basis
than in the past. Nevertheless, although the situation is changing rapidly, the
accounting rate system still applies to a significant volume of international traffic,
particularly to and from non-liberalised markets.
Despite the changes now permitted in some liberalised markets, to date there has
been little internationally coordinated institutional reform of the accounting rate
system although:
•  in June 1999, Study Group 3 of the International Telecommunications Union —
the multilateral organisation of 188 government and private sector members
responsible for its development — approved a recommendation designed to
permit alternative methods of remunerating providers (see appendix A for more
detail about the ITU and its activities);
•  the ITU is also currently considering proposals to phase settlement rates down
closer to cost-based target levels; and
•  the US Federal Communications Commission has unilaterally capped the




There are pressures in other areas of payment as well. For instance, there is growing
pressure to free up access by providers to international cables and for
interconnection rates (for connecting international and domestic networks) to be
aligned more closely to underlying costs.
Payment arrangements applying to Internet traffic, including the arrangements
between US and non-US Internet service providers (ISPs), are also coming under
pressure. A concern of providers outside the United States is that the cost of
international Internet capacity is not shared equitably. International attention is
currently being given to the question of Internet pricing by groups such as the
telecommunications working group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum.
This inquiry has provided the opportunity for a public review of progress in
reforming international telecommunications in the context of the recent
developments outlined above.
1.3 Consultation
To facilitate participation in the inquiry and to allow the maximum degree of public
scrutiny in the six months specified by the Assistant Treasurer, the Commission:
•  held informal discussions with 15 groups with varied interests and perspectives;
•  released an Issues Paper to assist those wishing to make written submissions;
•  invited written submissions — 20 submissions were received from providers and
users of international telecommunications, peak organisations and government
agencies;
•  released a Position Paper in June 1999 setting out preliminary options; and
•  conducted a public hearing in Sydney on 21 July 1999 to receive feedback on the
Position Paper.
Appendix B lists the names of organisations and individuals who have participated
in the inquiry.
The Commission expresses its appreciation to those who provided written
submissions to a firm deadline, or gave freely of their time to discuss inquiry issues.INTRODUCTION 7
1.4 Report structure
Chapters 2 and 3 of this report set out background information about the
international telecommunications market and payment arrangements. Chapter 4
analyses inefficiencies in payment arrangements, while chapter 5 looks at







Australia is a relatively small participant in the international telecommunications
market. For example, in 1997, outgoing traffic from Australia made up only 2.2 per
cent of outgoing traffic minutes from OECD countries (OECD 1999, p. 61).
Further, international telecommunications services account for only a relatively
small part of the Australian economy, comprising around 0.3 per cent of GDP in
1997 (OECD 1999, p. 60).
Nevertheless, international telecommunications services are important to many
Australian households and businesses. For households, these services facilitate
social and family ties between countries while for businesses, international
telecommunications services are vital in facilitating trade, and are an input for a
wide range of industries. DFAT considered that ‘the cost of international
telecommunications, whether by phone, fax or via the Internet, is an important
determinant of Australian exporters’ international competitiveness ...’ (sub.  11,
p. 1). As an input for the service s industries, total telecommunications makes up 5
per cent of costs (ABS 1997). Telecommunications plays a lesser role in
manufacturing, mining, agriculture, forestry and fishing, where it makes up between
1 and 2 per cent of costs.
In addition, growth in telecommunications contributes to growth in services trade in
its own right. Exports of communications (of which telecommunications forms the
major part) grew at an annual average rate of 19 per cent in the four years to
1997-98, contributing to a growth f igure for services trade of 9.5 per cent over the
same period (sub. 11, p. 1).
The importance of international telecommunications is likely to continue to increase
in the future, especially with rapid growth of the Internet and electronic commerce.10 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKET REGULATION
2.1 Describing the market
International telecommunications services are provided by way of networks of
country-to-country satellite and cable links, together with domestic infrastructure in
the sending and receiving countries (more details are given in IC 1997a and 1997b).
The international telecommunications market can be described in a number of ways,
including the following:
•  Services provided. Examples are telephone calls and facsimile services, email,
data, video and Internet access.
•  Technology employed in transmitting information (some commonly used
technologies are explained in box 2.1). In this regard, however, DOCITA
commented that ‘Technical advances, particularly digitalisation, are rapidly
undermining the assumptions that associate particular services with particular
technologies’ (sub.  6, p. 15). For example, a telephone call can be provided
either over traditional circuit switched links or over the Internet, using Internet
Protocol (box 2.2).
•  Payment arrangements between providers (these arrangements are explained in
more detail in chapter 3). In brief, these arrangements include:
-  the traditional accounting rate system and recent variants;
-  payment for the individual facilities used in service provision, such as
international leased lines and interconnection to domestic markets; and
-  payment for Internet traffic.
The rest of chapter 2 presents information about international traffic volumes,
Australian providers and consumers, and recent trends in consumer prices.
2.2 Traffic volumes
Data relating to the international telecommunications market are generally
incomplete and sometimes contradictory. This is partly a result of Australia’s light
handed regulatory approach to telecommunications — to date only limited
information about the market has been collected by official bodies and/or has been
required to be published (see section 6.6 in chapter 6 for some comments on future




Box 2.1 Common telecommunications technologies
Analogue signals: Signals by which information (such as voice or data) is conveyed
using continuously varying amplitude (strength) and frequency (tone). In contrast to
digital.
Digital signals: Signals by which information is conveyed by way of discrete values
(one or zero) which vary in time.
Channel: A path along which signals can be sent between two or more points.
Circuit switching: Temporary direct connection between two or more points in order
to provide the users with exclusive use of an open channel with which to exchange
information. A continuous circuit path is set up between the sender and receiver, in
contrast to many forms of packet switching, in which no such continuous path is
established.
Packet switching: Messages sent across a network are broken up into a series of
separate ‘packets’ each containing a small portion of the original message. Packets are
then sent across the network to their destination. Depending on the transmission
protocol, each packet may travel a different route and arrive at different times. Upon
arrival all packets are re-assembled into their original message.
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM):  An international packet switching standard
using a cell based approach in which each packet of information features a uniform
size of 35 bytes. All packets take identical routes to their eventual destination through a
‘virtual’ circuit. ATM has the advantage of smaller packet sizes and less destination
address information than some other packet switching standards. This results in faster
speeds in the switching process.
Frame relay: A high speed (up to 45 Mbps) packet switching protocol used in wide
area data networks.
A leased line: A ‘leased line’ is the lease of a specified amount of cable capacity for a
specified period. It generally provides a physical or virtual circuit to the user.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP): TCP and IP (Internet Protocol) are the
dominant communication protocols on today’s Internet. TCP enables two machines to
transmit data back and forth in a manner transparent to the operating system of each.
It defines the handling of packets, including segmentation, reassembly, connection,
separation and recovery of lost packets.
Internet: The Internet is a worldwide ‘network of networks’, interconnected by routers
and common communications protocols (TCP/IP). Although the Internet backbone
(large national networks) and other networks are often provided over the same lines as
traditional telephone networks, the traffic from each network is fundamentally different.
Whilst Internet traffic is packet switched, traditional telephone traffic is circuit switched.
From the consumer perspective, common uses of the Internet include electronic mail
(email) and the World Wide Web.
Source:  Derived from APEC (1999); Budde (1999b, p. 3); McKie-Mason and Varian (1997); Nelson (1998,
pp. 448, 465); OECD (1999 p. 93); PC (1999, pp. xv, xvii).12 INTERNATIONAL
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Box 2.2 Traditional voice traffic and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)
Voice traffic can be carried from sender to receiver by various technologies, including
traditional telecommunications links and Internet Protocol.
Traditional international telephone voice traffic is usually carried from a domestic
sender to the international gateway in the domestic country via the local (and often the
domestic long distance) Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The PSTN
provides the basic infrastructure for telecommunications services, and is available to all
users. Traffic is carried to the international gateway of the destination country and is
then carried to its final destination by the PSTN of the foreign country. All of this is
circuit switched — a dedicated channel of agreed bandwidth is established between
the sender and the receiver for the period of the call.
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), a packet switched service, involves the provision
of voice calls using the Internet Protocol (IP). A protocol is a set of rules for computers
to follow when communicating with each other. Standard protocols allow computers
from different manufacturers using different software to communicate effectively. IP
provides a unique 32-bit address for each machine connected to a network, and
handles addressing and forwarding of packets of data.
Although IP is one of the dominant protocols on today’s Internet, it can also be used on
public and private networks. Similarly, VoIP can be provided over the Internet, or
through other public or private networks.
Source:  Derived from APEC (1999); OECD (1999); PC (1999).
Telstra estimated that total international PSTN traffic (that is, circuit switched
traffic carried over infrastructure that is available to all users) to and from Australia
has been growing strongly in recent years (table  2.1). Over the period from 1995-96
to 1998-99, outgoing PSTN traffic increased by 21 per cent (approximately 7 per
cent annually), and incoming traffic by 40 per cent (12 per cent annually).
Table 2.1 Telstra’s estimate of international PSTN traffic from and to
Australia, 1995-96 to 1998-99 (millions of minutes)
Direction of traffic 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99a
From Australia 1150 1316 1365 1393
To Australia 944 1090 1219 1319
a Annualised estimate based on data to April 1999.
Source:  Telstra (sub. 4, p. 4).
In the past, international PSTN traffic from and to Australia has largely been settled
through the accounting rate system. For instance, in 1997, around 80 per cent of
total telephony traffic between Australia and the United States was settled according




indicated that, over time, providers have moved away from the accounting rate
system to more commercially focused arrangements, such as one-way prices agreed
by both parties and one-way prices set by destination. Such arrangements now cover
approximately 80 per cent of Telstra’s current total business (sub.  12, p. 1). Global
One also stated that other forms of payment have become more prevalent:
Australian carriers can now employ [wholly] owned circuits, IPLs/ISR [International
Private Lines/International Simple Resale, where providers switch international traffic
onto leased whole circuits] or cost based settlement rates on such routes. (Sub.  13, p. 2)
It is predicted that international PSTN traffic will continue to increase in absolute
terms although, as later discussed, its share of overall international traffic will
decrease. Ovum (1998, p. 250) estimated that outbound Australian PSTN traffic
will increase by about 170 per cent over the period from 1998 to 2008. A continuing
decline in charges, a high elasticity of demand and ongoing globalisation of
economies were expected to be major factors generating this traffic growth.
The most important destinations for Australian outgoing PSTN traffic are the
United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States (table  2.2). A number of
Asian countries are also important traffic destinations. Data for previous years (up-
to-date aggregate data are not available) show that, for incoming traffic, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States are again the most important.












Rest of World 40
Total 100
Source:   TeleGeography (1998, p. 159).
Given its market position, Telstra’s top three traffic destinations and sources mirror
those for Australian providers as a whole. Telstra’s 1998 annual report states that,
for 1997-98, the three main destinations of Telstra’s international calls were the
United Kingdom (19 per cent of outgoing minutes), New Zealand (15 per cent) and14 INTERNATIONAL
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the United States (13 per cent). The three main sources of Telstra’s international
calls were the United States (23 per cent of incoming minutes), New Zealand (19
per cent) and the United Kingdom (17 per cent).
Despite the continuing growth of international PSTN traffic, other types of traffic
including international data traffic, Internet traffic and international simple resale
have been increasing at a faster rate. Where payments are made between providers
for these types of traffic, they are generally on the basis of the facilities used: for
example, the lease of private lines and the provision of interconnection services.
Although a comprehensive measure of the total volume of such traffic is not
available, the total capacity of international cable and satellite links is expected to
increase much more rapidly than the PSTN traffic component, for Australia and
globally. This suggests major growth in non -PSTN traffic. Planned capacity out of
Australia could increase markedly in 2001 (figure  2.1), mainly due to the 640 Gbps
Australia-Japan link planned by Telstra. Total capacity crossing the Pacific and
Atlantic oceans is set to increase substantially in 2000 (figure  2.2).




















Figure 2.2 International cable capacity crossing the Pacific and Atlantic



















































a Does not include cables such as Telstra’s 640 Gbps cable link between Australia and Japan planned for
2001 (which causes the sharp rise in planned capacity for 2001 in figure 2.1).
Data source:   FCC quoted by Telstra (sub. 4, p. 4).
Internet
Internet traffic is increasing at a rapid rate and has become the predominant form of
traffic on many routes. For Telstra’s international routes, Internet traffic has been
consistently greater than PSTN traffic since early 1998 (figure  2.3).






























a Data after 30 June 1998 are Telstra forecasts.
Source: Telstra (sub. D18, p. 2).16 INTERNATIONAL
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According to Telstra, the majority of Australian international Internet traffic is
imported into Australia, although the proportion of exported traffic is increasing
over time (table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Australian international Internet traffic (terabytes)
Direction of traffic 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99a
Outgoing 10 125 325 595
Incoming 40 235 555 860
a Annualised estimate based on data to April 1999.
Source:  Telstra (sub. 4, p. 5).
Although it is difficult to track Internet traffic flows by source or destination, some
indicators are available. Telstra estimated that, of the Australian Internet traffic that
is carried over international links, 86 per cent of foreign originating traffic is
sourced from the United States, and 64 per cent of Australian originating traffic is
destined for the United States (table  2.4). The data in tables 2.3 and 2.4 together
suggest that, in absolute terms for 1998-99, some 740 terabytes originated in the
United States destined for Australia, and 380 terabytes originated in Australia
destined for the United States.
Table 2.4 Estimated origin and destination of Australian Internet traffic,
1999





Source:   Telstra (sub. 4, p. 5).
Because of the significance of US traffic, Telstra’s Internet capacity to the United
States far outweighs its capacity to any other country (table  2.5).











Deregulation of the Australian telecommunications market in July 1997 signalled
the end of the duopoly in the provision of fixed line carrier services (Telstra and
Optus), and the three provider mobile services market (Telstra, Optus and
Vodafone). By August 1999, the number of carrier licences had increased to 31
(although some providers have more than one licence). These carriers are able to
provide international telecommunications services, although not all presently do so.
A provider does not have to be licensed as a carrier to own or lease switching
facilities or international cable circuits. In mid-1999, as well as licensed carriers,
there were about 80 other providers of telecommunications services and more than
600 Internet service providers. The vast majority were not involved directly in the
provision of international telecommunications services.
Several of the new entrant licensed carriers and service providers are the Australian
subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign telecommunications companies. These include:
•  AT&T Australia Ltd (United States);
•  BT Australasia (United Kingdom);
•  Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co Ltd (KDD) (Japan);
•  MCI International Australia Ltd (United States);
•  NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) Australia Ltd (Japan);
•  Singapore Telecom (Singapore);
•  TMI Australia (Telecom Italia) (Italy);
•  Telecom New Zealand (New Zealand); and
•  Teleglobe Australia Pty Ltd (Canada).
Although Telstra has lost international PSTN market share since July 1997, it
remains the dominant provider at the Australian end of that market. Prior to July
1997, Telstra sent around 70 per cent of outgoing international PSTN traffic (at the
carrier level) from Australia to the rest of the world and terminated 73 per cent of
incoming traffic, with Cable & Wireless Optus sending and receiving the remainder.
Since then, Telstra’s share of international PSTN traffic has fallen around ten
percentage points for both outgoing and incoming minutes. This market share loss,
however, has been offset by growth in demand, so that the number of minutes sent
and received by Telstra has increased (Telstra  1998).18 INTERNATIONAL
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In regard to the Internet, Telstra receives and sends over three-quarters of the
international traffic to and from Australia (Budde 1999a, p. 3). Other international
traffic providers include Cable & Wireless Optus, AAPT, and OzEmail. As noted
above, Internet traffic has been growing very rapidly.
Investment and alliances
There is a trend towards consolidation in the international telecommunications
market. Mergers and acquisitions, as well as joint ventures and alliances, are leading
to fewer operators with larger market shares. Telstra stated:
The trend towards large international telecommunications mergers and alliances, and
more recently ‘mega-mergers’, is significant. It is becoming a growing feature of the
current international telecommunications market that major companies compete and
grow by mergers and acquisition. (Sub.  4, p. 7)
Factors driving the trend toward fewer providers include:
•  a reduction in barriers to trade in international telecommunications;
•  converging technologies;
•  the ability to offer uniform cross border services to business customers, in
particular multinational corporations;
•  scale economies in billing and administration; and
•  the need to increase foreign market share in response to increasing domestic
competition from smaller operators providing specialist services.
Some reports predict rapid and radical consolidation of the world’s major providers
down to between 5 and 10 superproviders in three years (Lowe 1999, p.  8c).
Rationalisation is also expected in the Australian telecommunications industry — a
survey of telecommunications executives predicted the long term survival of only 5
carriers, 23 other providers of telecommunications services and 35 Internet service
providers (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1998, p. 13).
The major global telecommunications alliances as at August 1999 were as follows:
•  AT&T and BT Concert;
•  MCI and WorldCom;
•  Infonet/Unisource;





These alliances, company groups with worldwide interests such as Cable &
Wireless, and internationally connected providers such as Equant and SITA,
provide end-to-end services, typically to large business customers such as
multinational corporations. Such traffic normally takes place outside the traditional
accounting rate system.
According to Telstra (sub. 4, p. 2), foreign carriers have set up in Australia in
various ways, including:
•  full or partial acquisition of equity in Australian telecommunications companies;
and
•  establishment of ‘points of presence’ (PoPs) in the major metropolitan centres to
service both retail and wholesale customers.
Australian providers also invest in other countries. For example, Telstra has
established points of presence in the United States, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand. Box 2.3 summarises Telstra’s global strategy.
2.4 Australian consumer demand
Nature of demand
There are several key features of the demand for telecommunications (including
international telecommunications) services which distinguish it from the demand for
many other goods and services.
One feature is that the consumption of telecommunications services (in common
with other network facilities-based activities) requires access to the
telecommunications network. Access gives consumers benefits from actually using
the network, as well as benefits when the network is not used. For example, a
consumer may benefit from an  option to make an emergency call, even though he or
she does not actually make the call.
Another feature is that telecommunications services are rarely consumed in
isolation. For example, the connection of additional consumers to the network
benefits existing consumers because the number of telephones (and the like) that
can be reached is increased and, where a consumer makes a call or sends an email,
another party — the receiver — is affected.20 INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKET REGULATION
A third feature of telecommunications demand is that it is expressed in many forms
such as by time of day (peak or off-peak), distance and volume (number of minutes
or bytes).
Box 2.3 Telstra’s global strategy
Telstra’s goal is to be a globally significant communications company, facilitating
seamless delivery of products and services to both wholesale and corporate
customers. Telstra already has widespread network capability through cable and
satellite agreements and equity agreements with global communications consortiums.
To further its global service network, Telstra plans to increase its switching points of
presence around the globe. The company’s international and wholesale businesses
have been identified as two key areas for future growth.
Some international investments by Telstra are listed below.
•  Invested US$171 million under a ten year partnership with the Vietnamese
Government carrier, VNPT, to upgrade Vietnam’s international network. More
investment is expected in Vietnam as Hanoi recently became a Telstra regional
headquarters. Telstra also has a similar contract to upgrade the international
network of Cambodia.
•  Owns 60 per cent of a joint venture, Mobitel (Private) Ltd, which operates a digital
mobile telephone network in Sri Lanka.
•  Launched India’s first meshed satellite based voice and data network as part of
Telstra Vishesh Communications Ltd, a joint venture with India’s VSNL. Telstra is
also building a network management system for the Indian Government.
•  Looking for a buyer for its 20 per cent stake in Mitra Global Telekomunikasi
Indonesia (MGTI), formed to install phone lines for the Indonesian Government.
Telstra has written down the value of its $60 million investment in MGTI to zero. It
has a $42 million exposure to the project relating to performance requirements.
•  Spending $50 million over the next three years to extend its Internet backbone into
the Palo Alto Internet exchange in the United States, to give greater control over
Internet routing and reliability. Involves adding 45Mbps of both way fibre capacity to
the United States and New Zealand, and establishing a joint Internet router at the
Palo Alto Internet exchange with the other members of APIC (Asia-Pacific Internet
Community) — Dacom Corporation (Korea), KDD Corporation (Japan), Cable and
Wireless HKT (Hong Kong) and Singapore Telecom.
•  Planning a 640 Gbps international cable between Australia and Japan with nine
other regional companies — China Telecom, Chunghwa Telecom (Taiwan), Cable &
Wireless HKT (Hong Kong), Japan Telecom, Korea Telecom, KDD Corporation,
NTT WorldWide Networks (Japan), Singapore Telecom and Telekom Malaysia.
Source:  Derived from Banaghan (1999); Butler (1999); Corben (1999); Riley (1999); Telstra (1998, 1999a,




Responsiveness of demand to price changes
Studies of the responsiveness of demand to changes in price (or the price elasticity
of demand) for certain types of telecommunications services were reviewed in an
Industry Commission staff paper (IC 1997b, chapter 3). The studies, which focused
on telephone calls, generally found that prices have a greater influence on the
consumption of international calls than for long distance or local calls. In Australian
studies, the price elasticity of demand for international calls was greater than one —
this means that an increase (decrease) in price would result in a more than
proportionate decrease (increase) in the quantity demanded. Moreover, the studies
found that residential users are more responsive to price than business users, and
more responsive in the off-peak than the peak periods.
Level of consumer expenditure
The average spending of an Australian business on international calls in 1997-98
was around $315, with the average residential user spending around $76, or about a
quarter of the amount spent by business (OECD 1999, pp. 174, 178–179).
2.5 Recent trends in Australian consumer prices
Changes in consumer prices give an indication of the benefits from reform (provider
prices are covered in chapter 3).
Participants were generally of the view that consumer prices for international
telecommunications services have substantially declined in recent years. For
example, Cable & Wireless Optus noted that its standard reference prices (a subset
of peak, off-peak and weekend rates based on a three minute call duration and its
ten most popular international call destinations) had fallen 26 per cent in real terms
since 1992 (sub. 5, p. 4). In addition, DOCITA noted that, between June 1997 and
June 1998, price reductions of up to 65 per cent had occurred for some international
calls (sub. 6, p. 34). Further, Telstra stated that its average traffic weighted price per
IDD minute decreased by 72 per cent over the year to May 1999. Over this period,
the most dramatic price falls were for high volume destinations such as the United
States, United Kingdom and New Zealand (sub. D17, pp.  1, 4–5).
Although this view was confirmed in studies produced by the ACCC, the
Productivity Commission and the OECD, there was general agreement in the22 INTERNATIONAL
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studies that retail prices in Australia were still above those provided in some other
developed nations (see box 2.4).
Box 2.4 Retail prices for international telecommunications services
The ACCC reported that Telstra’s overall weighted international call price had
decreased by 27 per cent from 1992 to 1998. The ACCC also compared the price of a
Telstra call from Australia to a particular country with the price of the same call made
from that country to Australia.  While in 1992 Telstra compared well — with most calls
made from other countries being more expensive than the equivalent Telstra call — in
1998 this situation was reversed. In 1998, the prices of Telstra’s international calls from
Australia were consistently more expensive than identical calls initiated in other
countries. This was caused by price decreases in the countries compared, rather than
Telstra price increases.
The Productivity Commission compared the performance of Australia’s
telecommunications services industry with those in other, generally high performing,
countries. This study found that European countries had lower prices for a basket of
both residential and business PSTN international calls than the non-European
countries (including Australia) used in the comparison. This is likely to reflect, in part,
the international call profile of the relevant countries — European countries had larger
traffic volumes and generally called closer neighbours, while the Australian traffic
profile had a smaller volume of international calls that traversed greater distances.
Telstra has attributed the low consumer prices faced in Sweden and Finland to their
light handed regulatory regimes (sub. D17, p. 8).
The OECD compared member countries’ average peak prices for calls with other
OECD countries. It found that average Australian peak international prices had
decreased since 1991, but that other OECD countries had (on average) achieved
greater reductions in peak prices.
For dial-up retail users of the Internet, the most important price is the combined PSTN
and Internet access price at peak and off peak rates. For consumers staying on line for
20 hours per month and calling an Internet service provider for the price of a local call
from the largest city, the OECD ranked Australia as having the third cheapest peak rate
and tenth cheapest off-peak rate.
Source:  ACCC (1998d); OECD (1999); PC (1999).
A recent Government decision to retain price caps on a range of services provided
by Telstra is intended to reduce average consumer prices (Alston 1999). As a result
of this decision, Telstra is required to reduce average prices for a broad basket of
services, including local and international calls and leased lines, by at least 5.5 per




Access and pricing of digital data and transmission services were investigated by
the ACCC in 1998 (ACCC 1998b). The ACCC subsequently ‘declared’ (that is, it
specified that it could now arbitrate to resolve disputes about the terms and
conditions of supply) certain data services and modified previous declarations in
order to address price rigidities and increase the effectiveness of the declarations in
meeting the needs of access seekers (ACCC 1998c).
Despite this action, ATUG (sub.  3, p. 3) suggested that the benefits of recent
telecommunications reform have not flowed through to users of dedicated links or




3 Payment arrangements and pressures
for change
Until recently, the traditional accounting rate system under the auspices of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has been the predominant form of
payment between providers in one country and providers in other countries for
international telecommunications services. However, in recent years this system has
been under pressure and a number of other payment arrangements have been
growing in importance.
This chapter commences with a brief review of the role of the ITU and other
significant international institutions involved with international telecommunications.
It then describes various payment arrangements for international
telecommunications setting out: details of the accounting rate system and pressures
on this system; payments made for the individual components of service such as
cable usage and interconnection; and peering, transmission and interconnection
payments for the Internet.
3.1 International institutions
Arrangements for the pricing of international telecommunications can be traced
back to 1865, when 20 European nations came together to form what is now known
as the ITU. In recent years, however, the WTO has also begun to have an important
role in telecommunications. As well, the actions of the US Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) have significant international implications. Each of these
institutions is discussed briefly below, with greater detail provided in appendix A.
The ITU, of which Australia is a Member State, is an international organisation
within which governments (Member States) and the private sector (Sector Members)
coordinate global telecom networks and services. It has established International
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) which Member States are bound to uphold.
Their purpose is to:
•  establish the general principles which relate to the provision and operation of
international telecommunications services offered to the public, as well as to the26 INTERNATIONAL
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underlying international telecommunication transport means used to provide
such services;
•  set rules applicable to governments and providers; and
•  facilitate global interconnection and interoperability of telecommunications
facilities and promote the harmonious development and efficient operation of
technical facilities, as well as the efficiency, usefulness and availability to the
public of international telecommunications services (sub. 6, p. 11).
  As well, a number of recommendations have been developed which aim to set out
methods which countries can use to implement the ITRs. Compliance with the
recommendations is not compulsory. In recognition of pressures for change, work is
being undertaken by the ITU to develop and refine recommendations relating to the
accounting rate system. ITU recommendations adopted in June 1999 could assist
future reform by allowing a choice of payment systems (see appendix A and section
6.2).
  The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT), which came into force
in February 1998, brought basic telecommunications into the scope of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for the first time. According to DFAT
(sub. 11, p. 5 and personal communication), 69 countries (the European Union
counting as one), accounting for around 93 per cent of world telecommunications
trade, entered commitments. This number had grown to 75 countries at November
1998 (WTO 1998a). The agreement binds governments and their regulators to
varying commitments about market access (including foreign direct investment
controls) and national treatment. In addition, a total of 57 countries, including
Australia, agreed to be bound by a Reference Paper, which sets out pro-competitive
regulatory principles for basic telecommunications services.
  According to DFAT’s submission, members of the WTO sought to agree on a set of
principles within the GATS for dealing with international accounting rates and
settlements for telecommunications (sub.  11, p. 6). As they were unable to agree at
that time, the accounting rate system was not covered by the ABT. However, WTO
members have agreed to return to the accounting rate issue at the next round of
GATS negotiations due to begin by 1  January 2000.
  Because of the volume of international telecommunications to, from, or through the
United States, the actions of the FCC have important significance for the accounting
rate system. Of particular note is the FCC’s attempt to unilaterally impose
‘benchmark’ or price caps on US settlement rates. Under a 1997 order, settlement
rates negotiated by US providers may not exceed 15 (US) cents per minute for




in middle-income nations; and 23 cents per minute for foreign providers in lower-
income nations. These benchmark rates are being phased in from 1 January 1999
over the period to 2003.
3.2 The international accounting rate system
The accounting rate system was developed by the ITU, initially for international
telegraphy, and later for other forms of international telecommunications traffic.
Conceptually, the accounting rate is meant to represent the total end-to-end cost of
making an international call. This comprises the cost of:
•  carrying the call through the domestic network of the country where the call
originates to an international gateway (ie origination);
•  international carriage typically by either cable or satellite to an international
exchange in the other country (international transmission); and
•  carrying the call from that international exchange to the called party
(termination).
Accounting rates are generally denominated in US dollars, gold francs, or Special
Drawing Rights (a monetary system based on a ‘basket’ of major currencies) per
paid minute of traffic. These accounting rates are normally negotiated bilaterally
between an international traffic provider in one country and a provider in the other
and/or between telecommunications administrations. Once the accounting rate has
been agreed, settlement rates are then determined, usually at half the accounting
rate.
Rather than making continuous payments to one another, providers settle their net
balances at the end of the settlement period. On any bilateral route, the actual
amount paid or received by a provider for call termination services is related to the
provider’s balance of incoming and outgoing traffic at the end of the settlement
period, and the (relevant) settlement rate (box  3.1). Thus, where traffic between
countries is balanced, no payment is made. Where there is a high settlement rate, the
payment made for a traffic imbalance is greater than where the settlement rate is
low.
  Special arrangements apply when traffic transits through one or more intermediate
countries between its origin and destination.
  Although comprehensive information on accounting rates for traffic to and from
Australia is not available, the FCC publishes accounting rates between the United
States and other countries, including Australia (see table  3.1). This information,28 INTERNATIONAL
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published in July 1999, apparently indicates that some providers have been able to
negotiate lower accounting rates than Telstra on the United States/Australia route.
Telstra has subsequently advised the Commission that it has moved to different
confidential commercial arrangements with US carriers (sub. D17, p. 5).
 
Box 3.1 Settlement for international telephony under the accounting
rate system
  When a call is made from country A to country B, the provider in country A collects
and retains the full customer charge and is liable to pay the provider in country B to
carry the call from the (notional) midpoint of the international circuit to its final
destination. In the same way, when the provider in country A terminates a call from
country B, it is liable to receive a payment from country B. In practice, payment is
made according to the balance of traffic.
  Suppose that at the end of a settlement period:
•  a provider in country A has terminated 100 minutes of traffic sent to it by a provider
in country B; and
•  the provider in country B has terminated 80 minutes of traffic sent from the provider
in country A.
  Then country A has a surplus of incoming over outgoing traffic of 20 minutes with the
country B provider. Similarly, the provider in country B has a deficit of the same
magnitude with the provider in country A. Therefore a net payment is made by the
deficit provider in country B to the surplus provider in country A. The value of the
payment would be 20 minutes multiplied by the (relevant) settlement rate per minute.
 
 
  Even though accounting rates have fallen in the last few years in non-liberalised
markets, they generally remain higher for traffic with non-liberalised markets. In the
absence of available Australian data, US rates provide a useful proxy, at least until
1999 when the FCC’s benchmark rates begin to take effect. The accounting rates
between the United States and the non-liberalised market of China, for instance,
remain significantly higher than with liberalised markets, such as Australia (table
3.1).
  Despite pressures on the accounting rate system (outlined below), it remains
important. For example, US data show that accounting rate traffic in 1997
accounted for 91 per cent of telephone traffic billed by Australian providers which
originated in Australia and terminated in the United States, and 79 per cent of US
billed telephone traffic which terminated in Australia (table  3.2).
  Nevertheless, the situation may be changing rapidly. Telstra advised the
Commission that more commercially oriented arrangements now cover




Table 3.1 Selected accounting rates with the United States: Australia,
Singapore and China, 1993 to 1999 ($US)
    1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999a
  Australia              
  Telstra   .76   .59   .59   .45   .42   .30   .29b
  Optus   .76   .59   .59   .43   .15 or
less
  .15 or
less
  .15 or
less
  AAPT               .30
  Axi-Corp Primus           .20   .20   .20
  TNS-Telegroupc           .10   .10   .10
  Singapore   .86   .92   .92   .90   .85   .52   na
  China   2.93   2.91   2.67   2.13   1.69   1.40   1.13
  a The FCC adopted benchmark settlement rates for countries to be phased in over the period to 1 January
2003. From 1 January 1999, the settlement rate for Australia and Singapore was 15 US cents per minute,
while the settlement rate for China is to be 23 US cents per minute by 1 January 2002.  b Although this rate
has been published by the FCC, Telstra advised that it has moved to different confidential commercial
arrangements with US carriers. c In February 1999, Telegroup filed for relief under the US Bankruptcy Act.
  Source:  FCC (1999a, 1999b).
Table 3.2 Australia-US international telephone traffic, 1997 (per cent)
  Traffic payment   Billed by Australian provider
(excludes transit traffic)
  Billed by US provider
  Traditional settlement   91   79
  Non traditional settlementa   9   21
  All traffic   100   100
  a Includes International Simple Resale (ISR), hubbed, switched and other traffic that is settled outside the
FCC’s International Settlement Policy based on the accounting rate system.
  Source:  FCC (1998, Tables A1, A62-64).
3.3 Pressures on the accounting rate system
  Until recently, international operators in most countries were monopolies and were
generally also the sole providers of local and domestic long distance facilities and
services. Within this environment, the accounting rate system provided the
advantages of simplicity, ease of administration and predictability. It provided a
stable basis for international telephony pricing and settlements between providers as
long as several fundamental criteria continued to be satisfied: international services
being jointly provided by monopoly partners; collection rates (ie end user charges)
approximately equal for the same call in both directions; settlement rates lower than
collection rates; and incoming and outgoing traffic being approximately in balance
(Madden and Savage 1997, p. 21).30 INTERNATIONAL
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  These conditions have become increasingly less relevant because of: the increasing
liberalisation of telecommunications markets; new technologies which have reduced
the cost of providing international services; increased transmission of data compared
with voice; imbalances in traffic flows; and the lack of specific provision for rapidly
growing areas such as mobile and the Internet. Because accounting rates have not
adjusted rapidly enough, these factors have placed the traditional accounting
arrangements under pressure.
  The nature of telecommunications services provision
  The traditional concept of international communications as a jointly provided
service is breaking down. DOCITA ‘promotes the understanding of international
telecommunications as a traded service, in which an operator in country B provides
a termination service to complete a call or deliver a message that is initiated through
an operator in country A’ (sub. 6, p. 28). As the World Telecommunication
Development Report indicated:
  We are moving from a world of one-to-one relations to a world of many-to-many.
(ITU 1997, p. 6)
  The examples given in box 3.2 of a number of ways in which communications
emanating from a provider in one country may be carried to their destination in
another country illustrate the breaking down of the monopoly supplier jointly
provided service model.
  These transmission possibilities illustrate an active market in international carriage
of telecommunications, independent of any one country’s national rules or market
regulations. They do not rely on the traditional notions of joint provision, of half-
circuits or a ‘midpoint’ of the international circuit.
  Global alliances and other ways of ‘doing business’ are further eroding the bilateral
relationship between providers. For example, as DOCITA points out:
  Global wholesale carriers such as PanAmSat or (in future) Project Oxygen also make it
unnecessary for individual carriers to negotiate directly with every carrier who might
terminate a service for them. To remain valid, the international regulations must
recognise the participation of new entities such as those that aggregate traffic from a
number of sources and deliver it with greater efficiency than a myriad of bilateral





Box 3.2 International telecommunications as traded services
  To illustrate the traded services nature of international telecommunications, this box
lists a number of different supply arrangements. Other possibilities also exist.
•  Cable owned jointly by the provider originating and the provider terminating the
signal.
•  Cable capacity owned wholly by one provider and terminating in the territory of
another country.
•  Cable capacity leased from a consortium in which one or both of the providers
have invested.
•  Satellite capacity owned by a provider (eg Cable & Wireless Optus), leased (eg
Telstra from PanAmSat), or allocated from an international satellite co-investment
organisation (INTELSAT or Inmarsat).
•  Capacity on alternate routing obtained on the bandwidth spot market.
•  Services wholly managed by a third party or consortium (eg Global One,
WorldCom MCI, AT&T).
•  Services ‘terminated’ in a third country and refiled to destination to take advantage
of differences in capacity and service pricing.
  Source: DOCITA (sub. 6, pp. 14-15).
 
 
  Further, the ACA goes on to comment that:
  the emergence of global alliances between major telecommunications providers may see
the emergence of commercial ‘ownership’ of all aspects of the international network,
including international telecommunications lines, which might well alter the traditional
approach to settlement rate strategies, based on commercial realities. (Sub. 7, p. 9)
  Following liberalisation of the Australian market in July 1997, there are about 12
international providers and global alliances operating from Australia (sub. 4, p. 2).
  Traffic imbalance
  The continuation of accounting rates at levels significantly above underlying costs,
together with large traffic imbalances have added to the pressure for accounting rate
reform. For the United States, the settlement deficit has grown from $1.2 billion in
1985 to $5.4 billion in 1996, amounting to around 3 per cent of the total US trade
deficit. Australia also had a settlement deficit — accounting rate traffic for Australia
was estimated to be around 25 per cent greater than inbound traffic in 1995-96.
Providers in developing countries, which have a higher volume of inbound than32 INTERNATIONAL
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outbound traffic, are estimated to receive about $10 billion a year in settlement
payments (Ovum 1998, p. 159).
  New forms of traffic
  ITU recommendations ‘apply to the exchange of traffic across the Public Switched
Telephony Network (PSTN). There are no regulated arrangements governing
settlements for some rapidly growing market segments such as mobile phones and
Internet services’ (sub. 6, p. 25).
  No differentiation of accounting rates is made between international calls to or from
fixed network subscribers and to or from mobile network subscribers. In particular,
no allowance is made for the higher charges often levied for interconnection with
mobile networks compared to interconnection with fixed networks. As a result, on
international calls to or from mobile phones, either the international facilities
operator or the mobile operator has to incur a loss when originating or terminating a
call. This is becoming a significant issue with the rapid growth in use of mobile
phones, including for international calls.
  Some responses
  The growing liberalisation of domestic telecommunications markets has enabled
monopoly providers in non-liberalised countries to seek to take advantage of
international providers in liberalised markets. As well, providers in liberalised and
non-liberalised countries have sought to exploit the weaknesses of the accounting
rate system.
  Exploitation of market power
  To guard against exploitation of market power, some countries (although not
Australia) currently adopt the following measures:
•  Proportionate return where the amount of bilateral traffic returned to a provider
by its foreign correspondent is determined by the proportion of the country’s
total outgoing traffic originated by that provider’s customers. For example, a
provider with 30 per cent market share of outbound international minutes on a
particular route would expect to receive 30 per cent of the inbound traffic on the
same route.
•  Parallel accounting requires that each provider serving a route receives the same




from negotiating lower rates from competing terminating providers. Parallel
accounting also limits the ability of a competitor in a country to gain an
advantage over its rivals.
  Chapter 4 explains various ways in which providers can seek to exploit remaining
monopoly powers.
  Alternative calling procedures
  International telecommunications providers can use a number of alternatives to the
traditional arrangements for routing traffic. These alternatives ‘bypass’ the
traditional cost-sharing arrangements of the accounting rate system. They may be
practised by traditional facilities-based providers or by service providers who
operate exclusively or partly by reselling the services of others. DOCITA identifies
refile, callback, international simple resale (ISR) and end-to-end interconnection as
examples of alternative calling procedures (sub. 6, p. 26). As the ACA similarly
points out:
  Inequities in the current system of settlement rates [have] led to development of
alternative calling procedures including calling cards, country direct services,
international resale and callback. (Sub. 7, p. 8)
  ISR and interconnection both involve the provision of the international component
of the telecommunications service by one provider, rather than by different
providers in the originating and terminating countries. More details are given in
chapter 4. Refile and callback are described below.
  Refile
  Refile is a form of transit routing where an intermediate country is incorrectly
recorded as the point of origination in order to take advantage of a lower settlement
rate for traffic from the intermediate country to the destination country. For
instance, assume a provider in country A can route traffic directly to country B at a
particular settlement rate, whereas a provider in country C can route traffic directly
to country B at a lower settlement rate. If the difference between the two settlement
rates is significant then, rather than pay the higher settlement rate governing the
direct route, the provider in country A may route its traffic to a provider in country
C, which then forwards the traffic to country B at its settlement rate. For this
service, the provider in country A pays the provider in country C a negotiated fee
(figure  3.1). The provider in country C may, for reasons such as exploiting
proportionate return policies with country B, be theoretically able to refile country
A’s traffic to country C free of charge to A.34 INTERNATIONAL
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  Callback is spurred by a combination of differential retail and wholesale prices. It
involves the joining of two calls by a callback operator: one from the operator to the
calling party, the other from the operator to the called party. In many cases, the
costs of the two calls from the callback operator is cheaper than if the calling party
contacted the called party directly using a domestic provider’s services. Callback
operators tend to be located in countries (such as the United States) which have
negotiated low settlement rates for call termination, while their customers are in
countries with high retail prices for international calls (figure  3.2).
  Although the ITU has been under some pressure from some countries to ban
callback, its Council has determined that it is the sovereign right of each country to
regulate telecommunications services. As of October 1998, callback is prohibited in





3.4 Payment for facilities
  Payment for traffic outside the accounting rate system tends to be based on the
facilities used or capacity purchased. This focuses attention on the underlying
elements making up the costs of international telecommunications, namely, cable or










Step 1: calling party contacts the 
callback operator in country C by 
such means as uncompleted call 
signalling 
Step 2: callback 
operator responds 
by calling to country 
A
Step 3: callback 
operator calls to 
country B and joins 
this call with the call 
to country A
  Cables
  Access to cable can be obtained in several ways. One involves the lease of half
circuits (for example, to access the United States, it would be necessary to lease a
half circuit from an Australian provider, as well as a half circuit from a US
provider). Payment is generally on a capacity basis. Telstra and Cable & Wireless
Optus have been the main providers of international leased line half circuits from
Australia.
  Alternatively, cable capacity can be purchased as a minimum investment unit
(MIU), or leased by means of an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) in a cable
consortium (box 3.3).
  Different arrangements for access are likely to apply to newer cables, soon to come
on line, some of which are being constructed by investors not traditionally
associated with the international telecommunications industry. Some of the cables36 INTERNATIONAL
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will be available to carriers only, on others full circuit capacity could be open to all
comers.
 
Box 3.3 Access to cables
  Minimum investment unit (MIU): this is equity in capacity on international cables in
cable consortia. It differs from an IRU in that it gives ownership of the cable, voting
rights, and rights to extra capacity if the design capacity of a cable is subsequently
expanded. This is often restricted to major carriers.
  Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU):  this is a measure used to denote the right to use
cables during the time and bandwidth specified in the IRU. It is essentially a lease on
part of a cable. IRU owners usually have the right to use capacity for the life of the
cable and are liable to pay maintenance charges.
  Source: Ovum 1998.
 
  Prices paid by providers
  Chapter 4 sets out some evidence that access to cable capacity can be expensive
relative to the underlying costs. Further, access has been difficult because of
restricted capacity.
  There is also evidence that prices for the Australian end half circuit have been
higher than for the far end half circuit. According to Nelson (1998, p.  475), average
standard prices in 1998 for the use of a 2Mbps half circuit from Australia to the
United States were:
•  Telstra half circuit fibre — $84 000 per month;
•  US carrier half circuit fibre — $40 000 to $60 000 per month;
•  satellite — $75 000 per month;
•  discount rates are offered on fixed term contracts (for example one, three, and
five year periods).
Telstra has indicated that ‘list prices are not the actual prices that customers pay. In
today’s competitive market all carriers including Telstra have strong off-tariff





  Interconnection charges are paid by providers for connection of international
circuits and traffic to the PSTN, mobile networks or to the Internet (see section 3.5
for payments for ISP interconnection).
  Prices paid by providers
  There is little direct evidence of the prices paid by providers of international
telecommunications for access to Telstra’s domestic network. However, in recent
work, the ACCC has examined Telstra’s undertakings for PSTN access for different
call durations and two traffic profiles. These profiles are for:
•  a ubiquitous access seeker interconnecting with Telstra in each of its 66 call
collection areas; and
•  a limited access seeker with a limited number of points of interconnection in
mainly CBD and metropolitan areas.
  ACCC’s assessment of these undertakings for a number of traffic profiles is set out
in table 3.3. The average charge per minute for a ubiquitous access seeker for a 4
minute call was 4.73 cents per minute. This is about 15 per cent higher than the
average charge for a limited access seeker because there is a higher proportion of
traffic in CBD and metropolitan areas and during off-peak times.
Table 3.3 Average access charges in Telstra’s 1997 PSTN undertakinga
(cents per minute)
  Duration of call   Ubiquitous access seeker   Limited access seeker
  2 minute   4.99   4.07
  4 minute   4.73   4.01
  6 minute   4.64   3.99
  10 minute   4.57   3.97
  a Unsuccessful calls comprise 27 per cent of total calls. The above charges exclude Telstra’s general
operations and maintenance charge in the Undertaking of 0.026 cents per conversation minute. An intra-call
collection area trunk charge is incurred in about 10 per cent of successful calls.
  Source: ACCC (1999a p. 45).
In June 1999, the ACCC rejected the terms and conditions of Telstra’s undertakings
for PSTN originating and terminating access. It estimated that the efficient cost of
access was between 1.73 to 2.53 cents per minute in 1998-99.38 INTERNATIONAL
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3.5 Payment for Internet traffic
  In order to fully understand payment arrangements for international traffic relating
to the Internet it is necessary to have some understanding of Internet payment
arrangements within both the United States and Australia, including the role of
‘peering’.
  Peering has traditionally been extensively used for Internet interconnection,
originating when Internet access was managed principally by a limited number of
subsidised regional entities. Under peering, providers can agree to accept all Internet
traffic addressed to their network without any charge. Such agreements can be based
on a ‘sender keeps all’ (SKA) settlement. In broad terms, this is sustainable where
there is an equality of traffic being exchanged and/or where the parties involved
perceive equal benefit from the interconnection.
  Payment for Internet traffic within the United States
  Many of the largest US private backbone providers have bilateral ‘peering’
arrangements to exchange traffic with each other. However, in April 1997, UUNet
one of the major ISPs in the United States, announced that it would only continue
peering with ISPs that met minimum requirements regarding quality of service and
backbone capacity. It would no longer accept peering requests from other ISPs
whose infrastructure would not allow for the exchange of similar traffic levels. The
company stated that these ISPs were seeking to use its network free of charge and
were not providing it with a return on its growing investment in infrastructure. Most
major ISPs in the United States are now adopting a similar approach.
  Since only large ISPs can effectively meet these criteria, the peering agreements
with smaller ISPs have been rescinded, and they are now being charged for the
interconnection service.
  Payment for Internet traffic within Australia
  Telstra is Australia’s largest provider of international Internet transmission links.
Telstra and a few competing providers of backbone networks offer transmission and
interconnection services to ISPs and amongst one another. Telstra also operates as
an ISP in its own right.
  Until recently, Telstra made no payment for any traffic that was carried by other ISP
competitors on its behalf. As a result, the ACCC issued a competition notice in May




Internet competitors for services by Telstra while, at the same time, refusing to pay
for the similar services it received from those same Internet customers. The ACCC
expressed concern that Telstra’s conduct could lead to it monopolising the Internet
industry in Australia. Telstra subsequently signed an agreement crediting OzEmail
for the carriage of Telstra’s Internet traffic. Agreements were subsequently made
with other competitors, Connect.com and Cable & Wireless Optus.
  Payment for Internet traffic between Australia and the United States
  Australian ISPs pay the full cost of the international capacity needed for
transmission of Internet traffic to and from the United States. They also pay port
charges (ie interconnection charges) to link into the Internet in the United States,
although US providers do not pay to link into the Internet in Australia.
  Telstra indicated that there is a range of options available to non-US Internet
providers to buy connectivity to the United States:
•  The US international half circuit lease and the Internet port charge are bundled
together into a single monthly tariff, usually on a flat rate/utilisation independent
basis. Such bundling can be easily done by US telecommunications providers
who own both international half circuit capacity to Australia and Internet
backbones.
•  The half circuit lease and the port charge are tariffed and billed separately by the
same provider.
•  The half circuit lease, domestic tail lease and the port charge are procured and
paid to separate operators.
•  The non-US operators acquire fully owned capacity to the United States, lease
domestic tail circuits, establish their own Internet Point of Presence (PoP) in the
United States and pay for port charges as required to one or more Internet
operators. As noted in box 2.3, Telstra intends to extend its Internet backbone
into the United States and establish, jointly with a number of Asian carriers, an
Internet router at the Palo Alto Internet exchange.
•  The non-US client connects to a local PoP of the US operator (eg UUNet in
Sydney) and pays a port charge. (Sub. 8, p. 4)
However, all these options involve the payment by Australian providers of the entire




The traditional payment arrangement for international telecommunications — the
accounting rate system — is rapidly breaking down. A number of other
arrangements are gaining prominence, including payment based on the components
of service supplied. Essentially, international telecommunications is being
transformed from a service jointly supplied by providers in more than one country,
to being a broadly traded service.
These developments have been driven by factors such as domestic market
liberalisation, technological change, development of new services and growth in




4 Inefficient pricing of payment
arrangements
This chapter examines ‘distortions or mispricing’ of payment arrangements. This
phrase, which is used in the terms of reference, is interpreted by the Commission to
mean the effects of inefficient pricing; that is, the effects of a divergence between
the price charged to providers and an appropriate cost benchmark. The chapter
begins by defining such a benchmark. It then discusses in broad terms the nature of
the effects of inefficient pricing on providers, final consumers and the community as
a whole. It concludes by presenting available evidence.
Evidence of inefficient pricing may be observed directly from comparisons between
prices and costs of international telecommunications services and indirectly, for
example, from providers’ competitive and investment responses to divergences.
However, caution is required in attributing particular provider responses to
inefficient pricing of payment arrangements as other factors may be at play. For
example, although inefficient prices may induce providers to form alliances with
other providers or to engage in international simple resale, such responses may have
occurred because of new opportunities arising from market liberalisation,
technological change and growth in demand.
Determining the overall impact of inefficient pricing of payment arrangements on
the Australian economy would involve aggregating the various economic effects,
not only for international telecommunications services, but for all activities in which
these services are inputs. There are insufficient data available to undertake such an
analysis.
4.1 Defining the cost benchmark
A widely accepted theoretical benchmark for assessing the efficiency of a price
charged in a payment arrangement is the long run marginal cost of providing the
relevant international telecommunications service (see box  4.1). (For a review of
benchmarks other than long run marginal cost see IC 1997b and BTCE 1997.)42 INTERNATIONAL
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In principle, long run marginal cost is the addition to the total cost of a facility
involved in providing the last unit of service, allowing for future changes in capacity
and technology. It includes operating costs, depreciation and provision for a normal
return on capital, but not unallocable (or common) costs. As the provision of a
service usually entails a number of facilities, the cost benchmark consists of the sum
of a number of long run marginal costs.
Box 4.1 Long run marginal cost pricing and public utility services
To assess the pricing of telecommunications services, it is useful to draw on the
general literature governing the pricing of public utility services. These services
typically are provided by government monopolies, involve facilities (or infrastructure)
such as roads, dams and sewerage treatment works and exhibit a particular cost
profile (see below).
The literature notes that there is a conflict between pricing for the efficient provision
(and use) of the services and pricing to recover total costs (that is, ensuring viability).
•  Efficiency would require that prices be set where the consumer valuation (or
willingness to pay) at the margin is equal to marginal cost; that is, the addition to
the total cost of providing the last unit of service. Marginal cost typically declines
with increases in units of the service. Long run marginal cost (LRMC) is marginal
cost which reflects changes in technology and capacity. Short run marginal cost
(SRMC) reflects a given technology and capacity.
•  However, if price were to be set at marginal cost (whether LRMC or SRMC) and
this were below average cost, then the provider would experience a loss and its
viability would be affected.
An approach to resolving this conflict involves setting prices equal to LRMC plus a
mark up to enable the recovery of unallocable costs and, thus, ensure viability. Ways
of minimising the inefficiency associated with pricing above marginal cost are to:
•  undertake Ramsey-Boiteux pricing (price services according to the elasticity of
consumer demand); or
•  impose an additional access price (where prices do not vary with use).
For example, to assess the settlement rate charged by a provider in country B to a
provider in country A, the relevant cost benchmark is the long run marginal cost of
carrying and terminating telephone calls in country B. Assuming that providers in
countries A and B have equal responsibility for international transmission capacity,
the benchmark consists of the sum of the long run marginal costs of:
•  transmitting the call from the midpoint of the international circuit to the
international gateway in country B;INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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•  using the international gateway in country B; and
•  transmitting the call from the international gateway to the called party in
country B.
However, there are situations in which it would be theoretically or practically
inappropriate to apply the concept of long run marginal cost to the pricing of
international telecommunications services.
•  As noted in box 4.1, basing price on long run marginal cost may not enable
recovery of the total cost of providing a service and, thus, enable provider
viability. To achieve full cost recovery, price may need to be set above long run
marginal cost. The ACCC uses this approach when assessing
telecommunications prices (see box 4.2).
•  Also, pricing at long run marginal cost would not lead to efficient use of a
facility in the short run where capacity is fully utilised or there is congestion;
that is, where there is high demand for existing capacity. In this situation, it
would be more efficient to price at (the higher) short run marginal cost. Such
pricing would act as a signal to providers to invest in the augmentation of
existing capacity.
•  Finally, measuring long run marginal cost can be a complicated exercise. Indeed,
telecommunications regulators often use long run average cost, which is easier to
derive and in some circumstances (such as constant returns to scale in provision)
approximate long run marginal cost.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds on the basis of assessing prices in payment
arrangements against various cost benchmarks. Although these benchmarks do not
always reflect long run marginal cost, they serve to illustrate inefficient pricing of
payment arrangements.
4.2 Broad economic effects of inefficient pricing
The prices charged under a payment arrangement that are above the appropriate cost
benchmark may have various economic effects on providers, final consumers and
the community as a whole. The effects on providers and final consumers depend on
whether a provider makes or receives payments. The effects on community welfare




Box 4.2 The ACCC’s approach to assessing telecommunications
prices
The ACCC’s assessment of telecommunications prices involves the application of a
total service long run incremental cost (TSLRIC) benchmark. This is defined as the
‘forward looking incremental cost’ of providing the whole service when the other
activities of the provider remain unchanged. TSLRIC includes operating and
maintenance costs, a normal commercial return on capital and common costs
‘causally related’ to the service (ACCC 1997, pp. 28, 38).
In its recent assessment of Telstra’s price undertaking for originating and terminating
access services to its public switched telephone network, the ACCC considered
whether to include a contribution to the ‘access deficit’ in relation to Telstra’s customer
access network (CAN) in its cost benchmark. The access deficit is the difference
between ‘non-call related costs’, such as line related costs, and ‘non-call related
revenues’, such as line rental and connection revenues.
The ACCC noted that retail price caps on residential line rental and connection
charges applying until 30 June 1999 (consisting of, among other things, a CPI minus
1 per cent price cap on residential line rentals and collection charges) constrained
Telstra from increasing the charges with the result there was an access deficit on
residential lines (but not on business lines or ISDN lines) (ACCC 1999a, p. 50). It said
that:
in the long-term, not allowing Telstra to recover a part of any residential access deficit from
originating and terminating access charges may:
•  encourage inefficient entry, by constraining Telstra from competing on its relative merits
in the long-distance and mobile markets;
•  discourage efficient investment by entrants (by making using Telstra’s CAN more
commercially attractive than building alternative facilities);
•  prevent Telstra from recovering legitimate costs;
•  result in Telstra under-investing in upgrading the CAN; and
•  create inefficient arbitrage opportunities (as different calls using the CAN will incur
different charges). (ACCC 1999a, p. 51)
The ACCC accordingly decided that it would include a contribution to Telstra’s
residential access deficit in its cost benchmark (ACCC 1999a, p. 52).
The ACCC did not form a view on whether Telstra would be able to increase line
rental and connection charges to fully recover line-related costs under new retail price
caps to apply from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2001. These include, among other things,
a retail price cap of CPI on a basket of line rentals and local calls for residential and
business customers and a retail price cap of CPI minus 5.5 per cent on a basket of
digital cellular mobile telephone services, connections, domestic leased lines,
international leased lines, local calls, trunk calls and international calls. However, the
ACCC stated it would give further consideration to how the access deficit should be




An excessive price under a payment arrangement affects a provider in different
ways depending on whether it pays or receives the price. If the provider pays, its
expenditure is higher than it would otherwise be. The provider may mitigate this
effect in the short term by passing on a proportion of the extra expenditure it must
pay through an increase in retail prices to final consumers. In the longer term, if
market conditions and regulation permit, the provider may reduce or avoid payments
through the implementation of various competitive and investment strategies such
as:
•  investing in new international infrastructure capacity, new technology, foreign
points of presence or alliances with other providers;
•  pursuing alternative payment arrangements; and/or
•  routing its traffic in alternative ways.
On the other hand, if a provider receives an excessive price, its revenue is higher
than otherwise. In the short term, it may retain the extra revenue to increase profits
which, in turn, may be used for investment or be distributed to shareholders. In the
longer term, if the market is liberalised, the existence of any excess profits in the
industry (that is, profits in excess of what is normal) may attract the entry of new
providers.
Although the responses of providers to pricing inefficiency in payment
arrangements are rationally-based — that is, the responses are prompted by a desire
to reduce or avoid unnecessary costs on them or to exploit market power — they do
not lead to an allocation of resources which maximises community-wide welfare.
Indeed, as is noted later, inefficient prices in payment arrangements may impose
welfare losses on the whole community.
Effects on final consumers
Final consumers may also be affected by excessive prices under payment
arrangements, albeit less directly than providers. For example, as noted above, a
provider who pays an excessive price may, in the short term, pass a proportion of
the extra cost on to final consumers by increasing retail prices. In response,
consumers may reduce demand for the service and/or increase demand for substitute
services. The extent to which higher retail prices are sustained other than in the
short term, however, depends on the competitiveness of the industry (that is, the




Effects on community welfare
Excessive prices in payment arrangements may impose welfare losses on the
community. Box 4.3 illustrates this using a framework which focuses on first order
effects at the provider level in the international telecommunications market in
Australia. Although effects at the final consumer level are not explicitly captured,
they are likely to be at least of the same magnitude provided there are no other
factors (other than payment arrangements) influencing prices.
The extent of the total welfare loss varies according to whether payments are made
by domestic providers to another domestic provider or to a foreign provider. In both
cases, the welfare loss includes the excess of the foregone value to providers (which
reflects foregone value to final consumers) over the long run marginal cost of the
service. If payments are made to foreign providers, the welfare loss also includes the
additional expenditure made by providers to obtain the service. This additional
expenditure is a direct transfer to foreigners and is, thus, not available to the
community to use in other activities. However, if payments are made to other
domestic providers, the additional expenditure is not lost to the community, but is
transferred domestically.
The welfare losses captured in box 4.3 constitute an important basis for estimating
the benefits available from reforms to payment arrangements. These benefits are
examined further in chapter 5.
4.3 Evidence of inefficient pricing: the accounting rate
system
Direct evidence
Despite declines in recent years in both settlement rates and the costs of terminating
international telephone calls, ITU Recommendations and Regulations continue to
enable providers to set settlement rates which diverge significantly from underlying
costs.
Settlement rates which exceed costs are a particular problem on routes to and from
countries which have not liberalised their markets. For example, in a series of
developing country case studies commissioned by the ITU in 1998, ‘effective’
settlement rates exceeded ‘effective’ costs per minute (in US cents) by 36 per cent
for Colombia, 144 per cent for Lesotho, 182 per cent for India and 429 per cent for
Sri Lanka (Wetteman and Kelly 1998, p. 26).INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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Box 4.3 Welfare losses of payment arrangements
Welfare losses may arise for Australia if the price charged under a payment
arrangement exceeds the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of providing the international
telecommunications service. This can be seen from the following partial equilibrium
diagram which shows the (derived) demand by Australian providers for the service, D,
in relation to the LRMC of provision. Although the diagram focuses on effects at the
provider level, the effects are likely to be at least of the same magnitude at the final
consumer level if there are no other factors influencing prices to consumers.
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that LRMC is constant. In this situation, there is
no need to raise prices above LRMC to recover total costs, as LRMC and long run
average cost are the same.
In the diagram, the price charged to providers, P
1, is associated with quantity
demanded by and supplied to providers of Q
1
. Had the efficient price, P
0
, been
charged, the quantity demanded and supplied would have been higher at Q
0.
One welfare loss of charging price P
1 is the excess of the foregone value to Australian
providers who would have purchased more of the service at the long run marginal cost
of providing it. This is represented by triangle A.
Depending on the source of supply, the additional expenditure made by Australian
providers to purchase the service at price P
1, represented by rectangle B, may also be
a welfare loss.
•  If foreigners provide the service, rectangle B accrues to them and, thus, is a
transfer to foreigners which is not available for Australians to use in other activities.
In this case, rectangle B also represents a welfare loss.
•  If Australians provide the service, rectangle B accrues to Australians and is, thus,
not a welfare loss, but a domestic transfer. How the cost of rectangle B is finally
distributed between Australian providers purchasing the service and final
consumers will depend on the responsiveness of consumer demand with respect to
price (or price elasticity) or on the degree of competition.
Thus, the total welfare loss to Australia of paying price P
1 under a payment
arrangement is the sum of triangle A and rectangle B in the case of foreign supply,
and only triangle A in the case of Australian supply.
Until recently, above cost settlement rates also continued to be a problem on routes
















cost data from TeleGeography (1998) for an international call from the United
States to Australia (see the table in box 4.4). The settlement rate for terminating a
call in Australia was 15 US cents per minute in July 1998. However, the per minute
cost of terminating a call in Australia — assuming this was the same as the
Australian interconnection rate (1.6 US cents per minute) and half circuit cost (0.3
US cents per minute) — was 1.9 US cents per minute. Thus, the settlement rate was
about eight times the cost of call termination.
However, the problem of above cost settlement rates on liberalised routes is
declining in significance. As Global One Communications said:
Due to the liberalisation of the Australian market and those of its primary
correspondents (USA, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong/ISR, EU), the issue of
excessive settlement rates and subsidisation of foreign carriers/users has substantially
eased. (Sub. 13, p. 2)
An exceptional case where settlement rates may not exceed costs relates to mobile
services. Ovum observed that, where an international telephone call is destined to a
mobile subscriber, the settlement rate is ‘not usually enough to cover both the cost
of the mobile operator’s domestic termination rate and the cost incurred by the
international facilities operators’ (1998,  p. 23). As noted in chapter 3, the
accounting rate system does not differentiate between calls to (or from) mobile
subscribers and calls to (or from) public switched telephone network (PSTN)
subscribers.
From an Australian provider’s viewpoint, such divergences between settlement rates
and costs only matter if there is a traffic deficit on a route; that is, the outgoing
traffic from Australia on a route is greater than the incoming traffic. For example,
Telstra expressed concerns about the settlement rates that it has with India, Sri
Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, the Middle East countries and Russia because they are
‘significantly above cost and because there is a net outflow of traffic from Australia
to these countries’ (sub. 4, p. 18).
Indirect evidence
Refile
Refile may be regarded as indirect evidence of inefficient pricing of the accounting
rate system. As explained in chapter 3, it involves the rerouting of traffic between
two countries through a third country to exploit settlement rate differences.INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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Box 4.4 Comparing the cost to a provider of different payment
arrangements
A US provider has generally four basic methods of carrying a call to Australia:
•  settlement with the Australian provider;
•  interconnection with the Australian provider;
•  international simple resale; and
•  service resale.
Using Telegeography’s data on price/cost elements of an international call from the
United States (Washington DC) to Australia in the table on the next page, it is
apparent that the cost of carrying a call to Australia for the US provider varies
according to the method used.
Settlement with Australian provider
To switch a call from the customer’s telephone to its own long distance network, the
US provider first pays the local exchange provider in Washington DC an origination
fee of 1.8 US cents per minute. The provider than moves the call along a ‘backhaul’
route; that is, from its national network to the undersea cable landing station. The
provider shifts the call onto the international ‘half circuit’ it owns, then pays the
Australian provider a settlement fee to transfer the call onto its matching half circuit
and to the final destination. The US provider’s marginal cost of using its own backhaul
and international half circuit is 0.3 US cents per minute. The settlement rate for the
Australian-end of the call is 15 US cents per minute. The total cost to the US provider
of the call is 17.1 US cents per minute.
Interconnection with Australian provider
Foreign providers can interconnect directly with Australian facilities. Rather than
financing a half circuit and paying the settlement rate, a US provider can purchase a
whole circuit all the way to an international gateway in Australia, which costs 0.6 US
cents per minute, then pay an Australian provider 1.6 US cents per minute to switch
and terminate the call. The total cost to the US provider of the call (which includes
their own origination and backhaul costs) is 4 US cents per minute.
International simple resale
A provider is not required to own its own circuits. Instead, it can switch traffic onto US-
Australia private lines leased from other providers. Total cost to the US provider of the
call including origination, private line lease and interconnection in Australia is 11.6 US
cents per minute.





To offer its customers access to Australia, the US provider can purchase the minutes
carried over another provider’s network in bulk and market those minutes as its own.
The two charges required for end-to-end service resale include 4 US cents for
origination and US domestic long distance and 7 US cents per minute for the
international carriage and termination. Total cost is 11 US cents per minute.
Price and cost elements of an international call from the United States to Australia




































Settlement 1.8 0.3 - - 15.0 - - 17.1
Inter-
connection
1.8 0.3 0.3 - - 1.6 - 4.0




4.0 - - - - - 7.0 11.0
a Some elements in the table reflect long run marginal costs, some elements are prices charged. 
b Refers
to international circuits. Costs per minute calculated assuming that each 64kbps circuit is compressed at
a 5:1 ratio and is used for ten years and that each voice path is used for four hours a day. 
c 
Settlement
rates are for peak rate traffic terminated by the largest Australian provider. Includes the cost of carrying a
call along a ‘backhaul route’; that is, from the national network to the undersea cable landing station.
d 
The interconnection rate used by Telegeography differs from Telstra’s 1997 price undertaking for
originating and terminating access services to the ACCC. 
e 
Retail prices are based on MCI One
International Calling Plan.
Source: TeleGeography (1998, pp. 59, 61).
Accurate estimation of the extent of refile is difficult, in part, because of the
unwillingness of some providers to volunteer this information. (However, Telstra
stated in its annual report for 1997-98 that it engages in refile — see Telstra 1998,
p. 6.) Refile is not permitted under ITU Recommendations and Regulations. Ovum,
however, reports estimates of refiled traffic consisting of between 10 and 30 per
cent of global traffic (Ovum 1998, p. 148).INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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The US Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) settlement rate benchmarks,
adopted in 1997 and phased in from 1  January 1999, could promote greater refile of
traffic. There are two possible sources:
•  from US providers unable to provide a direct service to a benchmarked country if
providers in that country were to refuse to terminate incoming traffic from the
United States at the lower benchmark rate; and
•  from providers in other countries seeking to exploit the benchmark rates.
Although refile is commonly described in the context of providers exploiting
differentials in settlement rates on different international routes, it may also occur as
a means of exploiting differentials between domestic charges (such as for
terminating to mobiles and for carriage of data) and settlement rates. For example,
Ovum observed that high rates for terminating domestic calls to mobiles have
created an incentive for providers, particularly in New Zealand, Sweden and the
United Kingdom, to engage in mobile refile:
Operators that refile [national originating] calls, carry it to another country and
reoriginate the call back into the first country, [thus] passing the call to the incumbent
fixed network operator under the conventional accounting rate system. The total cost to
the refiling operator is the settlement payment in either direction plus its network costs.
... This can be lower than the charge it would have to pay for terminating the call under
the normal domestic arrangement. (Ovum 1998, p. 235)
A major effect of refile is to place pressure on terminating providers to lower
settlement rates. Cable & Wireless Optus asserted that, as a result of refile, between
1997 and 1999, prices for terminating calls from Australia to China and Pakistan
have fallen by 50 per cent and to India by 10 per cent (sub. 5, p. 14).
Callback
Another example of indirect evidence of inefficient pricing of the accounting rate
system is callback. Callback arises because of differentials in retail and wholesale
prices and involves the joining of two calls by a callback operator: one from the
operator to the calling party, the other from the operator to the called party (see
chapter 3).
Callback is reported to be globally insignificant, but growing particularly in
monopoly markets. Kelly (1996) reported industry estimates of one per cent of
global traffic in 1995. He also noted that callback traffic increased tenfold since
1993. Ovum has recently reported in similar terms (Ovum 1998, p. 140).
Callback has various effects. One major effect is that it reverses traffic flows,
particularly between competitive and monopoly markets (FCC 1996, para 12). An52 INTERNATIONAL
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example of such a shift in traffic occurred in Hong Kong, where callback is legal
but there is a monopoly provider. Over a period of 18 months, traffic between the
United States and Hong Kong shifted from a balance of one to one to an imbalance
in October 1996 of seven minutes of outbound traffic from the United States to
Hong Kong for every minute of inbound traffic from Hong Kong to the United
States (FCC 1996, para 12). Such reversals in traffic flows can further affect the
settlement payments of countries with callback operators, such as the United States.
Another effect of callback is that it places pressure on the prices to final consumers
charged by dominant or incumbent providers as the prices charged by callback
operators are generally lower. For example, for certain Australian routes, callback
operator prices were approximately 36 to 85 per cent of the standard prices charged
by Telstra in 1997 (OECD 1997, table 7). The OECD observed that:
A number of operators [such as Telintar in Argentina] have begun to reduce
international prices for telephony and have begun to introduce volume discounts for
large customers in order to recapture traffic that they have lost to callback operators.
(OECD 1997, p. 26)
Xavier has also attributed Singapore Telecom’s ‘sharp price decreases’ in recent
years, despite having legislative monopoly status for the ensuing decade, to
competition from callback operators (Xavier 1997, p. 229).
Internet telephony
Growth in the use by providers of Internet telephony (or voice over Internet
Protocol) may also be considered indirect evidence of inefficient pricing of the
accounting rate system. Internet telephony involves the transmission of international
(and domestic) voice calls by means of Internet Protocol (see box 2.2).
Internet telephony permits Internet service providers (ISPs) and others to bypass the
accounting rate system and take advantage of the lower payments involved in
accessing the Internet. As Ovum said:
Internet messages are sent to all destinations for the same fixed charge to the originator.
The only ongoing cost incurred by the originator is for contacting the Internet access
node — typically the cost of a local call. Internet service providers are using this as a
way of bypassing accounting rates, allowing international calls for the price of a local
call. (Ovum 1998, p. 13)
Telstra said:
As a phone to phone substitute ... most observers agree that [Internet telephony] will
exploit a finite ‘arbitrage’ opportunity in certain markets created by high retail
international tariffs and high interconnection/termination charges. [Internet telephony]INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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allows the bypass of international carrier termination rates, especially in
protected/regulated markets. (Sub. 4, p. 13)
At this time, because of its inferior voice quality, Internet telephony does not appear
to be a significant threat to traditional means of voice call transmission. Telstra
estimated that around 360 million minutes of voice calls are being carried over the
Internet Protocol, equivalent to about five per cent of total international voice
minutes (sub. 4, p. 13). The ACA, however, said:
[the inferior speech quality] will be quickly overcome, and [Internet telephony] currently
represents a significant driver to reduce carriage costs, for both new and established
providers. As quality increases, the divergence of costs and prices might be expected to
close up significantly. (Sub. 7, p. 7)
Anti-competitive behaviour by foreign providers
The combination of above cost settlement rates and asymmetries between providers
in terms of the degree of competition they face in their home markets may
contribute to anti-competitive behaviour. If there is asymmetry in competition, there
may be an incentive for providers whose home market is closed (foreign
monopolists) to engage in anti-competitive behaviour in markets open to
competition to acquire a greater share of the rents from above cost settlement rates.   
The main forms of anti-competitive behaviour are whipsawing, one way bypass and
predatory pricing (see box 4.5). These forms of behaviour can impose welfare losses
on the community with the competitive market because they involve:
•  in the case of whipsawing and one way bypass, revenue transfers from
competitive providers to foreign monopolists, which is not available for
competitive providers to use in other activities; or
•  in the case of predatory pricing, the long term risk of price increases to final
consumers in the competitive market.
Such behaviour can be dealt with by regulators in various ways, for example, in
Australia under Rules of Conduct for dealings with international operators and the
general anti-competitive provisions of the Trade Practices Act.
Evidence of the incidence of these behaviours in the Australian market is not clear.
DOCITA was of the view that the Rules of Conduct have acted as a sufficient
deterrent to such conduct (sub.  6, p. 36).54 INTERNATIONAL
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Box 4.5 Types of anti-competitive behaviour by foreign providers
Whipsawing occurs when a foreign monopolist uses its bargaining leverage against
particular providers from competitive markets (competitive providers) to acquire a
greater share of the stream of rents flowing from the accounting rate system by
reducing the settlement rates it pays and/or by increasing the settlement rates it
receives for call termination services. Where a traffic imbalance in favour of the
competitive market (or monopoly market) arises, competitive providers would receive
(or make) lower (or higher) settlement payments and thus experience reduced
revenues. The extra revenue transferred to the foreign monopolist under whipsawing
is effectively a welfare loss to the community with the competitive market; the extra
revenue is no longer available to the competitive provider to use in other activities.   
One way bypass occurs when a foreign monopolist either sets up an affiliate or
leases a private line in a competitive market and terminates (or even refiles) its own
incoming traffic. The bypass is ‘one way’ because competitive providers are unable to
obtain equivalent entry in the foreign monopolist’s home market. As a result of one
way bypass, competitive providers would receive a significantly reduced number or
even a cessation of incoming calls from the monopoly market, resulting in a traffic
imbalance in the foreign monopolist’s (or affiliate’s) favour. Competitive providers
would make higher settlement payments and thus experience reduced revenues. The
extra revenue transferred to the foreign monopolist under one way bypass is
effectively a welfare loss to the community with the competitive market; the extra
revenue is no longer available to the competitive provider to use in other activities.
Predatory pricing occurs when a foreign monopolist uses the revenues it receives
from terminating calls at above cost settlement rates to subsidise the predatory pricing
strategy of an affiliate in a competitive market. Predatory pricing is a short term
strategy which involves the affiliate setting its prices to consumers below the cost of
provision which other providers cannot match without losing revenues. In principle, it
could lead to the other providers exiting the industry, thereby allowing the affiliate to
raise its prices in the longer term.
The actions of regulators
Since the early 1990s, national regulators have responded to concerns and perceived
problems about the accounting rate system in a number of ways. Their responses, in
themselves, provide indirect evidence of inefficient pricing of the accounting rate
system.
In relation to the level of settlement rates, the most notable action to date has been
by the US FCC. In a 1997 Order, the FCC unilaterally capped the settlement rates
that US providers can pay to foreign providers through the imposition of
benchmarks. As noted in chapter 3, the benchmark rates vary according to the level
of country income (measured by Gross National Product per capita) and are beingINEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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phased in over a four year period beginning 1  January 1999. More information
about this action is given in appendix  A.
Various actions have also been implemented to deal with any anti-competitive
behaviour of foreign monopolists. Examples of regulatory responses in Australia
and the United States are given in box  4.6.
An issue is the extent to which the potential benefits from such regulatory responses
are undermined or outweighed by any resulting inefficiencies. For example,
although proportionate return is intended to address whipsawing, it may deter new
entry into the international telecommunications market. As Ovum noted:
The operation of proportionate return ... acts as a barrier to entry to new carriers,
because it favours established operators by guaranteeing them a flow of return traffic.
(Ovum 1998, p. 165)
Similarly, parallel accounting may constrain prices to levels that are above what
would tend to occur in a competitive market. Again, Ovum said:
This is because a lower [settlement rate] offered to one party would immediately be
available to all other parties. In such circumstances, no operator will reduce its rate,
since it would not result in a compensatory gain in market share. Parallel accounting
therefore prevents operators competing on price to attract terminating traffic. (Ovum
1998, p. 166)
Telstra expressed concerns about the effects of ‘inflexible regulatory arrangements’.
Specifically, it considered that requirements for:
•  prior approval of the national regulator to any changes in settlement rates would
result in delays and provide a barrier to foreign providers agreeing to changes;
•  bilateral agreements to be filed with the national regulator would provide an
administrative barrier to providers agreeing to rate reductions and may make
them reluctant to do so because of concerns about confidentiality; and
•  parallel accounting and proportionate return would effectively prohibit foreign
providers from entering into new more commercially orientated arrangements
(sub. 4, p. 12).
Other responses
Participants and various commentators referred generally to other types of provider
responses which could, in certain circumstances, be taken as indirect evidence of
inefficient pricing of the accounting rate system (see, for example, DOCITA sub. 6,
p. 28; Telstra sub. 4, pp. 12–13; Leive 1997; and Ovum 1998).56 INTERNATIONAL
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Box 4.6 Regulatory responses to anti-competitive behaviour of foreign
providers
Australia
The ACCC may deal with the anti-competitive behaviour of foreign monopolists under
Rules of Conduct for dealings with international operators prepared by the Minister in
accordance with Part 20 of the Telecommunications Act 1997. The object of the Rules
is to prevent ‘international telecommunications operators’ from engaging in
‘unacceptable conduct’ in Australia.
‘Unacceptable conduct’ is the use of market power or any legal rights or legal status,
or any other conduct, in a manner that is, or is likely to be, contrary to Australia’s
‘national interest’. No examples of what constitutes unacceptable conduct are given
either in the Rules or by the ACCC.
The Rules provide, among other things, that:
•  providers operating in Australia ‘use all reasonable endeavours to prevent, mitigate
or remedy unacceptable conduct’ engaged by the international operator;
•  the ACCC can request information from an Australian provider or international
telecommunications operator about agreements in relation to charges or
telecommunications traffic;
•  the ACCC may direct an Australian provider to:
–  make an agreement with an international telecommunications operator on
specific charges for an international service dealt with under the agreement; or
–  make an agreement with an international telecommunications operator in
relation to allocating all or part of latter’s traffic to providers in a particular
manner; or
–  act in its dealings with an international telecommunications operator in a
particular manner to prevent, mitigate or remedy unacceptable conduct engaged
in by the operator;
•  if the agreement (or a provision of the agreement) is inconsistent with the Rules of
Conduct it becomes unenforceable. In addition, providers (carriers) are effectively
in breach of a licence condition and, thus, subject to pecuniary penalties of up to
$10 million upfront plus $1 million for each day that the breach continues to occur.
There is potential overlap between the Rules and the general anti-competitive
provisions of the  Trade Practices Act 1974. For example, if an international
telecommunications operator has assets in Australia and was behaving anti-
competitively, the ACCC could apply the Trade Practices Act provisions, rather than
the Rules. However, only the Rules could apply where international
telecommunications operators had no assets in Australia.




Up to the time this report was finalised, only one complaint had been lodged under
the Rules. As the complainant did not substantiate its complaint, ACCC took no
further action (sub. D20, p. 4). DOCITA said that:
in the absence of [such action], DOCITA would have to assume that no foreign policies
were having the effect of supporting anti-competitive conduct in the Australian market.
(Sub. 6, p. 36)
United States
The FCC deals with the anti-competitive behaviour of foreign monopolists through its
International Settlements Policy and through its 1997 Order on benchmark settlement
rates.
The International Settlements Policy addresses whipsawing by requiring equal
division of accounting rates, non-discriminatory treatment of US providers,
proportionate return of inbound traffic and parallel accounting. The need to comply
with the Policy was recently lifted in relation to arrangements between US providers
and foreign non-dominant providers on competitive routes. Although the FCC
considered Telstra to have market power in the Australian market, Telstra is not
subject to the Policy because the Australia-US route is an approved International
Simple Resale (ISR) route and the company operates ISR agreements with US
providers (sub. D18, p. 4).
The 1997 Order addresses one way bypass and predatory pricing (described in the
Order as ‘price squeeze’) through benchmark settlement rates. The FCC deals with
one way bypass by permitting a foreign provider to offer services over international
private lines only if at least half of the traffic on the route in question is settled at rates
at or below the relevant benchmark. The FCC deals with predatory pricing by
requiring all US providers to pay the foreign provider no more than the relevant
benchmark rate.
Source:  DOCITA (sub. 6); ACCC (sub. 10); and appendix A.
These responses have included:
•  investment in new capacity;
•  leased line resale (also known as private line resale or international simple
resale);
•  international alliances of operators; and
•  interconnection.
However, there has been no evidence presented to the inquiry of specific examples
of these responses, particularly in relation to Australian providers, which could be
directly attributed to above cost settlement rates.58 INTERNATIONAL
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4.4 Evidence of inefficient pricing: payments for
facilities
The main payment arrangements assessed here relate to interconnection to the
domestic PSTN, leasing of international cable capacity and access to ‘backhaul’.
Direct evidence
Interconnection
There is direct evidence that prices for interconnection to Telstra’s PSTN in
Australia are not reflective of underlying costs.
Telstra lodged a price undertaking with the ACCC in 1997 for originating and
terminating access services to its PSTN. The ACCC assessed the average usage-
based price of 4.73 cents per minute in the undertaking to be at least two times total
service long run incremental cost (TSLRIC). (The ACCC also assessed this price
against historical cost and international price benchmarks.) TSLRIC was estimated
at between 1.87 and 2.77 cents per minute, depending on trench lengths. It consisted
of:
•  between 0.45 and 1.10 cents per minute contribution to the residential ‘access
deficit’ on the customer access network (CAN) — the difference between
residential ‘non call-related costs’, such as line related costs, and residential
‘non-call related revenues’, such as line rental and connection revenues; and
•  between 1.42 and 1.67 cents per minute ‘call conveyance’ costs (ACCC 1999a,
p. 72 and box 4.2).
Although the ACCC noted the argument that it was efficient to recover costs of the
CAN from line rentals and connection charges (and thus obviate the need for
including a contribution to the access deficit in the cost base for assessing Telstra’s
price undertaking), it said:
to the extent that Telstra is constrained from increasing line rental and connection
charges by retail price cap regulations and does incur an access deficit on recovery of
the efficient costs of the CAN, then it must recover these costs from call revenues. This
includes some or all of local calls, long distance calls, toll-free calls, fixed to mobile and
mobile to fixed calls ... (ACCC 1999a, p. 49)
The ACCC thus decided that, given retail price controls applying until 30 June
1999, it would include a contribution to Telstra’s residential access deficit in its cost
benchmark. The ACCC did not form a view on whether Telstra would be able toINEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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increase line rental and connection charges to fully recover line-related costs under
new retail price controls to apply from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2001. It stated,
however, that it will give further consideration to how the access deficit should be
treated under the new controls (ACCC 1999a, p. 52).
Leasing of lines
There is direct evidence to suggest that the prices for leasing international cable
capacity exceed underlying costs. Telegeography (see the table in box 4.4)
estimated the price for leasing a whole circuit between Australia and the United
States in July 1998 at 7.3 US cents per minute compared with a cost of 0.6 US cents
per minute; thus, the price is about twelve times that cost.
Also, it is possible to infer that prices are not cost-based from data collected
recently by the OECD on pricing differences between countries for leasing similar
capacities and lengths of cable. The data show that (OECD 1999, p. 189):
•  for domestic leased line prices in 1998, the United States and Australia were,
respectively, 68 and 6 per cent below the OECD average, whereas Japan and
New Zealand were, respectively, 13 and 8 per cent above the OECD average;
and
•  for international leased line prices in 1998, Australia and Japan were,
respectively 116 and 35 per cent above the OECD average, whereas the United
Kingdom and the United States were 18 and 16 per cent, respectively, below the
OECD average.
Telstra, however, considered that the OECD data are ‘skewed towards shorter
routes pricing and also towards countries which have better economies of scale’
(sub. D19, p. 2).
Backhaul
Some participants commented on pricing inefficiencies associated with access to
backhaul; the inland private circuit between a cable landing station and a domestic
provider’s switch. Global One Communications noted that:
In Australia ... Global One amongst others is compelled to pay exorbitant Telstra prices
for backhaul transmission as such transmission is non or weakly contested. Similarly, in
a number of other jurisdictions, where Global One operates, the incumbent monopolist
control over the last access/transmission mile(s), often means that any competitive
advantage in wet transmission is soon eroded by the monopoly pricing of dry, backhaul




Practical restrictions in purchasing international capacity from cable consortia
Although legal restrictions in purchasing capacity from traditional cable consortia
such as through IRUs have been lifted in many countries, in practice, availability to
non-members can remain restricted. The restricted availability arises because of the
internal requirements imposed by consortia members on the purchase of capacity as
well as limited capacity available for purchase. Ovum said:
[Carriers who are] co-owners or [existing consortium members] have had opportunities
to buy capacity as Minimum Investment Units, and can buy common reserve capacity
from the consortium. Co-owners are able to purchase whole capacity circuits. ... carriers
that are not co-owners face restrictions on the capacity they may acquire, and a pricing
policy that may have little relation to the economic value of the asset they are acquiring.
In addition, they have to persuade two operators to sell them matched capacity, and
neither operator may be prepared to sell without the prior agreement of the other.
(Ovum 1998, p. 170)
TeleGeography also noted the restrictiveness of consortia rules that require non-
members to purchase international cable capacity in the form of IRUs rather than
more short term (and cheaper) property rights (TeleGeography 1998, p. 93).
However, given the current growth in investment in new cable capacity and the
emergence of new cable consortia, such practical restrictions are likely to become
less important.
Investment in new cable capacity
The combination of continuing high pricing of, and practical access restrictions to,
existing capacity have created incentives for new international cable investment by
providers, including by those not originally from the telecommunications industry.
Ovum offered the following investments as examples:
•  the Fibre Optic Link Around the Globe (FLAG) — a 27  000 km cable
commissioned in 1997, linking Europe, the Middle East and Asia and costing
$US1.5 billion with most of the funding coming from non-telecommunications
sources;
•  FLUTE — a plan for a submarine cable system linking the United Kingdom,
Belgium and the Netherlands; and
•  Hermes Europe Railtel — a joint venture between Global TeleSystems Group (a
US telecommunications provider) and Hit Rail BV (a Dutch company which is
owned by a consortium of 11 European rail operators) (see Ovum 1998, p. 146).INEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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Telstra, however, has argued that investments such in the TAT 12/13 cable, the
TPC-5 cable, the Southern Cross cable and in the SE-ME-WE-3 cable are not
examples of responses to excessive pricing or practical access restrictions, but of
strong demand growth:
Surely, what we are seeing here is not inefficiency but rather the market at work – that
is, the response of supply to strong and sustained growth in demand. (Sub. D17, p. 3)
4.5 Evidence of inefficient pricing: payments for
Internet traffic
As noted in chapter 3, there are many different types of payment arrangements
between ISPs. The main payment arrangement examined here is between major ISPs
(that is, backbone providers) outside of the United States (such as Telstra) and
major ISPs in the United States (such as UUNet). This payment arrangement
includes payments by non-US ISPs to US ISPs for leasing their half circuits and for
‘port charges’ (which may be regarded as charges for interconnection with
backbone networks). US ISPs make no such payments to non-US ISPs.
This payment arrangement has arisen because of the ability of a few large US ISPs
to exert market power over international access to major US backbone networks.
This market power is not surprising given the history of the development of the
Internet, which begins with substantial investment by the US Government and
includes the early adoption of peering arrangements. Telstra said:
the market power of the larger USA Internet networks vis a vis non USA operators is
reinforced by the structure of Internet interconnections which developed originally in the
USA. This structure reflects not only the nature of Internet technology but also the lack
of any agreed transactions or payment systems between major backbone providers. …
At the moment, given the continued preponderance of the USA as both a source and
destination of Internet traffic and the effective absence of international cost transfers to
USA operators, there is little pressure on the USA operators to change current
arrangements with non USA operators. (Sub. D18, p. 3)
Assessment of the payment arrangement requires identifying the services provided
under the arrangement that are demanded by, or benefit, a customer ISP as well as
the relevant prices and underlying costs. The services include the provision of
capacity (or bandwidth) to facilitate the transport of Internet traffic to and from the
ISP and interconnection with the ISP’s backbone network, but not content as this is





There are pricing inefficiencies in the payment arrangement to the extent that prices
(or the absence of prices) charged for the services provided to customer ISPs do not
match underlying costs or reflect the benefits received.
•  Non-US ISPs are paying for capacity to enable the transport of traffic from
which they do not benefit — they pay for capacity required to send and receive
all traffic to and from the US. (Conversely, US ISPs are not paying for capacity
to enable the transport of traffic from which they benefit.)
•  US ISPs are benefiting from interconnection with backbone networks in other
countries for which they do not pay ‘port charges’.
•  Flat pricing structures in US ‘port charges’ to non-US ISPs may not reflect the
costs of any congestion that the latter impose on other customers (see later for
evidence of congestion). (However, some backbone providers such as Telstra,
UUNet and NZGate, do charge on a usage basis, for example, on a per bit, byte
or packet received or sent.)
Determining the degree to which ISPs benefit from Internet traffic is complex. At
this time, ISPs do not have in place a system to track and determine the nature of
traffic. The APEC Telecommunications Working Group noted:
in the case of the Internet as currently constituted, ISPs have lacked the resources to
track traffic and cost causation and, until now, have had little incentive to devise
metering and tracking systems. (APEC 1999a, chapter 3, p. 2)
Simply observing the direction of traffic flows may not be enough.
First, an ISP may generate substantially more outbound traffic than inbound traffic
as a result of external file transfer requests and World Wide Web visits to sites
located on, or accessible through, its network. The APEC Telecommunications
Working Group said that ‘a more complete examination of the ... transaction would
show that the US ISP has responded to an initial request for service originated via
another ISP’ (APEC 1999a, chapter 3, p. 2).
A second complication is the ‘push and pull’ nature of traffic. As Nelson (1998,
p. 478) noted, ‘a question arises as to who is responsibl e for payment of data
automatically sent by Internet sites whether or not the user seeks it’. Examples
include unsolicited advertising banners.
Another complication is the seemingly random pattern of routes that traffic may
take. The OECD noted:
If the traffic flowing between [a] ... country and the United States was contained within
a single international link and the geographical borders of both countries a model forINEFFICIENT PRICING OF
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sharing infrastructure costs might be self evident. However, the Internet does not
transport traffic in such a precisely defined or bounded way. Not only might IP packets
travel along different paths, traversing different countries, but so might the routing
information drawn from global root servers. (OECD 1998, p. 37)
It is also not appropriate to presume there is symmetry in the benefits between non-
US ISPs and US ISPs. The APEC Telecommunications Working Group said:
The balance of utility has skewed heavily to the United States, because of the
attractiveness of what US sites have to offer and because the ISPs seeking access
historically have had less to offer by way of both networking facilities and number of
Web sites. (APEC 1999a, chapter 3, p. 4)
Telstra acknowledged that the Australian benefit of ‘Internet connection’ to the
United States is higher than that for United States to Australia and, accordingly, the
traditional half circuit sharing formula governing the transmission of voice calls
should not automatically apply. It estimated the delineation of benefits as 20 to 30
per cent to US ISPs and 70 to 80 per cent to Australian ISPs (sub. 4, p. 15).
Despite the complexities noted above, some work is currently being undertaken
within the industry to develop a billing system standard. Press reports indicate that
19 of the world’s major providers of telecommunications services met in California
recently to develop an Internet billing standard, which is to be called the Internet
Protocol Detail Record. They intend to finalise development of the standard by the
end of 1999 and to present the result to the appropriate standard setting bodies
(Australian Financial Review, 5 August 1999, p. 28).
Indirect evidence
Investment in cables and port facilities
Because non-US ISPs must pay for Internet traffic to and from the United States,
they have a significant incentive to reduce this payment through investment in new
capacity to and port facilities in the United States. This incentive is compounded by
congestion problems on the Internet due to flat rate port charges (see below) as well
as by the pricing differentials involved in leasing existing cable capacity (and noted
in section 4.4).
The extent to which non-US ISPs are responding in this way is indirect evidence of
inefficient pricing of the payment arrangement.
Australian providers such as Telstra have been making substantial investments in
recent years in new (largely cable) capacity to, and port facilities in, the United64 INTERNATIONAL
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States. Telstra has expanded its international network for Internet carriage
significantly over the last five years; its total capacity to the United States increased
from 1.5 Mbit/s to 280 Mbit/s between 1994 and 1999 and is estimated to increase
to over 4 Gbit/s by 2003 (sub. 4, p. 3). As noted in box 2.3, Telstra is giving
particular focus to extending its network into the Palo Alto Internet Exchange by
investing $50 million in adding capacity and establishing a router in conjunction
with other regional providers.
Alternative routing strategies
The implementation of alternative routing strategies by non-US ISPs is also indirect
evidence of inefficient pricing of the payment arrangement in relation to both
acquiring international cable capacity and interconnection.
‘Hot potato’ routing is a strategy whereby a non-US ISP finds a site provided by
another ISP for low cost offloading of traffic and transportation over a long haul to
the final destination. The APEC Telecommunications Working Group said:
In the worst case scenario, an ISP in the Asia Pacific region might secure access to the
rest of the world courtesy of one or more US ISPs and via one peering point [which] the
Asia Pacific ISP accessed via selfprovisioned international private lines. While seemingly
burdensome to force selfprovisioning the ability to access the rest of the world via other
ISP facilities presents quite a bargain, particularly in light of comparatively cheap private
line rate for access to the United States relative to other points. (APEC 1999a, chapter
3, p. 5)
The OECD observed that European countries with less expensive trans Atlantic
prices may be the points of departure for ISPs with trans European networks to
‘aggregate’ international traffic; for example, UUNet’s largest connections between
Europe and the United States are from the United Kingdom (OECD 1998, p. 39).
The rerouting of domestic and/or intra-regional Internet traffic by way of the United
States may also occur. The OECD reported that more than half of intra-European
and intra-Asian traffic is transported by way of the United States (OECD 1998,
p. 10).
Various commentators (such as the APEC Telecommunications Working Group and
the OECD) attributed this rerouting to the relatively high cost of domestic leased
lines and interconnection in non-US countries. For example, the OECD noted:
that it is often less expensive for European ISPs to purchase trans Atlantic capacity, to
traffic exchange points in the United States, than to purchase equivalent trans European
capacity to European Internet exchange points. (OECD 1998, p. 39)




Congestion, particularly at the point of international interconnection, may be
indirect evidence of inefficient pricing of the payment arrangement and, in
particular, of flat pricing structures. Congestion can manifest itself as either a traffic
loss (a packet does not reach its destination) or a traffic delay (Nelson 1998, p.
464).
Various commentators have referred to anecdotal evidence of congestion. For
example, MacKie-Mason and Varian (1997, pp.  41–2) said:
many services on the Internet have experienced severe congestion problems. Large FTP
archives, Web servers at the National Centre for Supercomputer Applications, the
original Archie site at McGill University, and many services have had serious problems
with overuse. ... Congestion on the trans-Atlantic link, which has been only 6 megabits
per second, has been quite severe, causing researchers who require substantial
bandwidth to schedule their work during the wee hours. Since the advent of WWW and
CU-SeeMe video-conferencing, there has also been seriously disruptive congestion in
Europe. Indeed, for a period beginning in 1995, EUnet (the main European Internet
backbone) forbade the use of CU-SeeMe without advance permission.
Telstra considered that the absence of an ‘international payment mechanism’ for
traffic carriage to be a major cause of congestion in the Internet. It said that:
The international telephony system however distorted and inefficient it may have been,
provided good rewards for successful calls and none for failed calls, encouraging
operators to dimension for peak usage. The Internet, operating under a ‘best efforts’
service paradigm, provides far less rewards for units of traffic carried, no direct penalties
for dropped packets, hence less direct incentive to invest in increased network capacity.
A range of technological solutions has been developed for the problem of quality of
service but it is difficult to see how these can be deployed across multiple networks in
different geographies without an inter-provider payment system. (Sub. D17, pp. 6–7)
4.6 Summing up
There is various direct evidence of ‘distortions or mispricing’ or inefficient pricing
of payment arrangements:
•  the settlement rate charged by Australian providers for terminating a call from
the United States is about eight times TeleGeography’s estimate of the cost of
call termination;
•  settlement rates paid in respect of traffic to and from other countries also greatly
exceed underlying costs;66 INTERNATIONAL
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•  Telstra’s price for interconnecting to its PSTN is at least two times the ACCC’s
estimate of the efficient cost of providing the service (which includes a
contribution to the ‘access deficit’ as well as the cost of ‘call conveyance’);
•  the price of leasing a whole circuit between Australia and the United States is
about twelve times TeleGeography’s estimate of underlying cost;
•  various aspects of the payment arrangement applying to Internet traffic between
the United States and other countries exhibit pricing inefficiency in that non-US
ISPs are paying for capacity to enable the transport of traffic from which they do
not benefit, and US ISPs are benefiting from interconnection with backbone
networks in other countries for which they do not pay ‘port charges’.
The existence of this broad range of pricing inefficiencies has influenced the
competitive and investment behaviour of providers. Providers have sought to
minimise the cost of pricing inefficiencies on themselves and have continued to
exploit remaining available market power. Although such ‘second-best’ behaviour is
rationally-based it does not lead to an allocation of resources which maximises
community-wide welfare; indeed, inefficient prices may impose welfare losses on
the community.
Although there is considerable evidence of the competitive and investment
behaviour of Australian providers in international telecommunications markets
around the world, it is difficult to link this behaviour directly to inefficient pricing
of payment arrangements. Other motivating factors may be at play such as providers
availing themselves of new opportunities arising from market liberalisation,
technological change and growth in demand.
To the extent to which there is inefficient pricing of payment arrangements, there
are thus benefits to be achieved from reforms. Chapter 5 quantifies the benefits from




5 Quantifying reform benefits
The terms of reference request the Commission to examine and report on
‘community benefits from reform of settlement arrangements, examining both the
domestic and international components of the international telecommunications
market’.
In the past few years, the Australian community has begun to benefit from changes
in the regulatory settings for international telecommunications. A number of factors
are contributing to the benefits.
•  Liberalisation of market access in many countries (including Australia from
1 July 1997) is breaking down previous monopolisation of supply.
•  Changes by regulators in particular countries to the settlement ‘rules’ have
facilitated competition, for example through asymmetric and differential
settlement rates. Similarly, some countries have recently allowed different
payment systems such as international simple resale.
•  As a consequence of market liberalisation and rule changes, it is also becoming
easier for providers to moderate the effects of the traditional settlement
arrangements in traffic with non-liberalised markets.
These benefits are coming about even though little internationally coordinated
institutional change in the international settlement arrangements themselves has
been implemented (although there has been much discussion of the need for such
reform and, in June 1999, the ITU adopted some recommendations which could
assist future reform — see section 6.2 in chapter 6).
At present, however, some problems remain, for example in respect of traffic with
non-liberalised markets, interconnection prices and Internet traffic (see chapter 4).
Even for traffic with liberalised markets, accounting rates and other forms of
payment can still be higher than cost. Accordingly, benefits could be obtained from
further reform.
This chapter concentrates on the benefits from reform, experienced at the provider
level. However, it is important to recognise that the benefits which providers may
obtain do not necessarily flow through to users. For example, as reported further in
chapter 6, there is some evidence that benefits have not flowed through to users of
dedicated links or data services.68 INTERNATIONAL
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5.1 Benefits from reform
Chapters 2 and 3 present information about such changes as:
•  reductions in accounting rates;
•  growth in telecommunications traffic;
•  the development of new forms of traffic such as international simple resale;
•  greater freedom for providers to invest in other countries and to establish
alliances; and
•  expansion in availability of international cable links.
Not all such changes can necessarily be taken as indicators of the benefits of reform
in international telecommunications — much of the growth in traffic volumes, for
example, arises from technological change and the globalisation of economies.
Further, such simple indicators do not provide information about whether the  net
economic welfare benefits could, or should, have been greater. Some issues
complicate the analysis, for example:
•  when Australia sends less traffic to a particular country than it receives, a
reduction in the accounting rate would reduce Australian providers’ revenue;
•  some of the changes may just transfer revenue from one sector of the Australian
community to another (see box 4.3 in chapter 4); and
•  excess costs can increase if the underlying costs of international
telecommunications fall more quickly than accounting rates.
Accordingly, a comprehensive assessment of reform benefits needs a measure which
takes into account changes in prices, changes in traffic, and changes in costs.
Such comprehensive measurement does not appear possible. Quite significant
changes occurred in Australian and foreign telecommunications markets during
1997 and 1998 — indeed, the consequences of these changes are still working
through — and full traffic data are unavailable. Australian regulators do not collect
and publish comprehensive market data.  TeleGeography 1999: Global
Telecommunications Traffic Statistics and Commentary, the most comprehensive
readily available public compilation of traffic data, does not report traffic incoming
to Australia. Nor are Australian settlement rates publicly available. There are also
difficulties in measuring the volume of non-accounting rate traffic, such as Internet
traffic (see section 4.5).
In its Position Paper, the Commission presented material which endeavoured to
indicate broad orders of magnitude of benefits, and invited all interested parties toQUANTIFYING
REFORM BENEFITS
69
comment on the merits of attempting any more definitive measurement on a case
study basis. AAPT was the only participant which commented directly on this issue
stating that ‘identification of key issues and the options for reform, including
achievement of those reforms, must remain as a priority to any measurement
activity’ (sub. D15, p. 2). After further consideration of the value of the data likely
to be produced by a more detailed analysis in the context of this inquiry, the
Commission has decided not to proceed further.
5.2 Accounting rate system
Prior to July 1997, the carriage of international traffic in and out of Australia was
limited to a duopoly — Telstra and Cable & Wireless Optus. Lack of domestic
competition for international traffic, together with the inefficiencies of the
accounting rate system, led to prices well above underlying costs and a resultant
significant welfare loss (net of transfers) to the Australian community. An indicative
estimate of this loss for 1995-96 was given in IC (1997a) as some $375 million per
annum.
However that estimate attempted to measure the welfare loss incurred through
Australian consumers paying high prices to Australian providers. In contrast, the
current inquiry mainly concerns prices paid (and received) by  Australian providers
to (from)  foreign providers. This has two contrasting effects: first, the price
difference at the provider level could be expected to be less than at the consumer
level; second, for reasons explained in chapter 4, paying excess prices to foreigners
represents a greater welfare loss to Australians than does paying excess prices to
other Australians.
The Commission has only been able to estimate the revenue loss arising from
paying excess prices to foreigners. Table 5.1 estimates the 1995-96 loss due to the
accounting rate system at about $108 million. Spread over all outgoing traffic, this
equates to about 11 cents per minute.
There are a number of caveats to these estimates:
•  the traffic weighted settlement rate is an estimate based on total traffic. Although
it is assumed that the average settlement rate weighted on the basis of traffic
imbalances is the same, this is unlikely to be the case. Ideally, the estimates
should be built up on a country-by-country basis; and
•  the traffic data shown are assumed to relate to traffic settled under the
accounting rate system. Even in 1995-96, traffic was beginning to move through70 INTERNATIONAL
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alternative means such as refile and callback. The effect this would have on the
revenue loss estimates, however, is uncertain.
Table 5.1 Estimated revenue loss from the accounting rate system
(Indicative only, not definitive) (Australian currency)
Item 1995-96 estimate
Traffic weighted settlement rate paid to foreigners 65 cents per minute
Underlying cost (half circuit) 10.9 cents per minute
Balance of traffic 200 000 000 minutes
Revenue loss to Australia $108 million
Total outgoing traffic 1 000 000 000 minutes
Loss per minute 10.8 cents per minute
Source: Based on data from IC (1997a).
Possible future benefits
How much of these potential benefits have been realised since 1995-96, and what
benefits remain to be achieved? In answering these questions, a number of
significant market-based changes since that time need to be considered:
•  accounting rates have generally fallen and thus, other things being equal, the
average settlement rate weighted on the basis of traffic imbalances should have
fallen. This would reduce the current estimate of revenue loss;
•  the underlying costs of telephone calls have fallen significantly, possibly to as
low as 2.1 US cents per minute, or around 3.2 Australian cents per minute per
half circuit (see the table in box 4.4). This would increase the revenue loss
estimate; and
•  a much greater proportion of traffic previously settled under the accounting rate
system takes place under more commercially oriented arrangements. Telstra, for
instance, indicated that as much as 80 per cent of its traffic is now settled at
commercial rates (see section 2.2). As well, alternative means of delivery such as
refile offer providers greater opportunities to balance their traffic flows with
particular countries, thus reducing the extent of any settlement payments. These
factors would also reduce the revenue loss estimate.
These considerations suggest that, at the provider level, much of the past revenue
loss arising from the accounting rate system may have been eliminated already.
The potential benefits to be achieved from further reform of the accounting rate
system may not be as low as this suggests, however.QUANTIFYING
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•  First, underlying costs, for transmission and possibly also for interconnection,
are likely to continue to decline — unless these cost falls are matched by further
price reductions, or the net traffic balance deficit decreases, the welfare loss
arising from traffic remaining in the accounting rate system will increase.
•  Second, as noted in chapter 4, the accounting rate system causes other possible
inefficiencies in terms of investment, traffic routing, and alliances. These costs
are not captured by the above estimates.
5.3 Payments for facilities
This section covers traffic for which payment is made according to the components
of service supplied, such as leased lines and interconnection services. Internet traffic
is covered in the next section. As discussed in chapter 2, the volume of such non-
accounting rate international traffic is increasing greatly.
A full calculation of the possible benefits of reform for this type of traffic was not
possible. There is limited historical and current public data about the leasing of lines
(and satellite circuits), and the nature and extent of traffic flows along them. The
data problem is magnified by ongoing rapid regulatory change and rapid traffic
growth, particularly of the Internet.
However, as chapter 4 noted, there is evidence that some inefficiencies remain.
Leased lines
In regard to the use of circuits by providers with ownership rights, the significance
of inefficiency in pricing, if any, would partly depend on the balance between the
number of circuits purchased by Australian providers from foreign providers and the
number purchased by foreign providers from Australian providers. Any loss on
outward traffic through excess prices paid to foreign providers could be offset by
gain arising from prices received for inwards traffic. In this respect, this is similar to
the accounting rate system.
Such an offset, however, is not available to users without ownership rights. In this
case, any excess price would apply to the full volume of traffic (or line capacity).
Some of the excess price could flow to domestic providers owning capacity (in
economic terms this is partly a transfer and partly a welfare loss), and some to
foreigners.
Until July 1997, all traffic in and out of Australia was carried by Telstra or Cable &
Wireless Optus. This may have limited the use of leased lines and held up prices.72 INTERNATIONAL
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The Commission has no direct evidence of the extent of any excess prices in cable
utilisation. However, from the table in box 4.4 in chapter 4, it appears that the
current per minute equivalent excess price may be of the order of 7 US cents, say
10.5 Australian cents.
Interconnection
As noted in chapter 4, the ACCC has been studying interconnection rates for both
fixed and mobile services.
•  In June 1999, the ACCC found that Telstra’s proposed fixed network
interconnection charge of an average of nearly 5 cents per minute was more than
double the costs that an efficient operator would incur in providing these
services. If this figure can also be taken as typical of existing agreements
between providers in the Australian market, an excess interconnection price of
some 2-3 cents per minute applies. (In economic terms, some of this would
represent a transfer and some a welfare loss.) The ACCC suggested that there
could be a saving of some $400 million per annum at the consumer level if
interconnection prices are reduced — although this is due mainly to the
importance of national long distance traffic.
•  In a draft decision published in February 1999, the ACCC rejected Telstra’s
undertaking in regard to mobile interconnection on the basis of the proposed
non-price terms and conditions.
Possible future benefits
As cable capacity increases, and as technological change enables greater
compression of data, underlying costs should rapidly fall. Projections about cable
capacity and costs (see chapters 2 and 4) suggest that, in the near future, call
conveyance costs will become insignificant.
The central question is whether prices will fall to a similar extent. This is certainly
possible, although a definite answer cannot be given, as there is growing investment
in international cable systems by suppliers not associated with the
telecommunications providers (see section 4.4).
For interconnection, the ACCC investigations should result in the better alignment
of interconnection prices with costs.QUANTIFYING
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5.4 Payments for Internet traffic
Internet traffic is carried over the same cable lines and satellite circuits as discussed
above. There must also be interconnection between domestic networks and
international circuits. Accordingly, payments for Internet traffic should benefit from
the changes described above in relation to leased lines and interconnection.
In regard to the specific payment arrangements for Internet traffic, Australia
currently pays the line and interconnection/port costs of all such traffic to and from
the United States. As discussed in chapter 4, although there is no reason for
Australia and the United States to pay  equal shares of the line and interconnection
costs for Internet traffic originating in or destined for the United States, in a
competitive market the United States would pay at least  some of the cost.
According to data provided by Telstra (see chapter 2), approximately 75 per cent of
international Internet traffic to and from Australia is with the United States. Some of
this merely transits the United States — but Telstra indicated that at least 60 per
cent of total traffic has the United States as its  origin or destination. The balance of
Internet traffic with the United States is approximately 2:1 — ie 1Mb of Australian
IP packets are sent to the United States for every 2Mb of packets sent to Australia
from the United States.
Telstra estimated the revenue loss to Australian providers as a result of current
pricing arrangements at about $45-72 million per annum (sub.  8, p. 4). This was
derived as follows:
•  the annual total cost for the Australian market of international Internet
connections is some A$300 million;
•  trans-Pacific bandwidth costs represent 75-80 per cent of total bandwidth costs
for Australian operators; and
•  the US should bear some 20-30 per cent of this cost.
Possible future benefits
Internet traffic is growing rapidly. Telstra considered that ‘a conservative growth
estimate’ for traffic/bandwidth would be 100 per cent per annum (sub.  8, p. 5). This
suggests that the excess cost borne by Australia under existing payment
arrangements could also grow rapidly.
There are some caveats, however. Telstra indicated that:74 INTERNATIONAL
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allowance must be made for reduction in unit costs/prices of international bandwidth due
to new higher capacity submarine cable systems and also competition between USA
backbone providers. (Sub.  8, p. 5)
As well, excess port costs could be reduced as Australian providers link directly into
US Internet exchange points. In this regard, for example, Telstra has announced
that, as part of the Asia-Pacific Internet Community grouping of Asian carriers, it is
to extend its backbone Internet network into the Palo Alto Internet Exchange
(PAIX) in the United States (see box 2.3).
5.5 Conclusion
The estimates presented in this chapter suggest that at the provider level:
•  most of the revenue loss to Australia (estimated at some $108 million for
1995-96) arising from high accounting rates may have already been eliminated;
•  an excess price of 2-3 cents per minute may apply in Australia to interconnection
with Telstra’s domestic network;
•  on a per minute equivalent basis, an excess price of about 10 cents may apply on
leased lines for international traffic; and
•  in regard to the Internet, Australian providers bear a total excess cost of about
$45-72 million per annum.
Although these preliminary estimates, and thus the possible future benefits at the
provider level from further change, may appear small in absolute terms:
•  they are important relative to the size of the international telecommunications
sector;
•  the potential gains will increase as underlying costs continue to fall;
•  the estimates do not capture inefficiencies arising from behaviour such as refile
and callback; and
•  they are based on current traffic volumes. As traffic volumes are increasing
rapidly — Internet traffic is doubling each year, for example — total excess
costs and potential gains could also increase rapidly.
Further, these estimates are likely to understate the benefits at the final consumer
level which could be obtained through reforms leading to greater efficiency in
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6 Issues and options
This chapter sets out objectives for reform and issues and options relating to future
international telecommunications market regulation. The discussion is followed by
consideration of passing on the benefits from reform to final consumers and of the
international negotiation process.
The Commission has concluded that the broad strategies adopted by Australia in
pursuing international telecommunications reform are appropriate. Further, it is
clear that the greatest benefits for Australia have resulted from the liberalisation of
its own domestic market and the markets of such countries as the United States, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand.
Rather than making recommendations, the Commission has developed a series of
findings — included at the end of the Overview — which respond to the terms of
reference.
6.1 Objectives for reform
Continuing reform of telecommunications markets, domestic and international, has
the potential to:
•  increase the efficiency of production and use of international
telecommunications in Australia;
•  reduce excess prices paid by Australian users of telecommunications to domestic
and foreign providers; and thus
•  benefit the Australian community as a whole.
As explained in chapter 4, these objectives are more likely to be attained in a market
environment where prices reflect the underlying costs of providing
telecommunications services. Such an environment would:
•  facilitate competition by allowing market access;
•  treat Australian and foreign providers equally;
•  allow providers freedom to negotiate with each other;
•  provide the price signals to encourage efficient new investment;76 INTERNATIONAL
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•  be largely self regulatory;
•  guard against abuse of market power by individual firms, whether Australian or
foreign; and
•  facilitate technological change.
In general, participants supported these objectives. Box 6.1 summarises some
participants’ views on appropriate market settings.
Governments can promote these objectives by:
•  ensuring domestic regulation is appropriate, transparent and light handed; and
•  discussing and negotiating internationally to:
-  encourage the development of similar liberalised markets in other countries;
and
-  achieve reform of relevant international institutional arrangements.
6.2 Accounting rate system
As set out in chapter 5, the revenue loss to Australia arising from the inefficiencies
of the existing accounting rate system may now be less than in the past.
Nevertheless, problems remain in particular with international telecommunications
traffic to and from countries with non-liberalised markets which continue to use the
accounting rate system. Further, although there has been progress towards market
liberalisation through the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, reform of
the accounting rate system itself has been slow.
A series of amendments to the ITU Recommendations on settlement have been
going through the ITU ratification process for some considerable time. Agreement
was reached in June 1999 to changes which give countries a choice of:
•  the existing bilateral accounting rate system;
•  one way cost-oriented termination charges; and
•  any form of bilateral settlement on which they agree.
However, despite the additional options, many countries are likely to continue to
favour the traditional accounting rate system mainly because they receive
substantial foreign earnings from that system (see chapter 3). This is evidenced by
the comment of DOCITA:
While these amendments may appear elementary, negotiation through a multilateral
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years, and was concluded only under the threat of unilateral price setting by the United
States Federal Communications Commission. (Sub.  6, p. 21)
Box 6.1 Views on reform objectives
Australian Information Industry Association (sub. 2, p. 2)
Required features of a telecommunications sector reform program:
•  legislative backing;
•  all entrants treated equally;
•  adequately supported by Government with an independent regulator;
•  local industry is an active participant in the infrastructure and the implementation of
self regulation;
•  points of authority and responsibility of the various stakeholders are clearly
defined;
•  includes a comprehensive access regime and effective tools to address anti-
competitive conduct; and
•  conforms with existing international requirements.
Telstra (sub. 4, p. 16)
The following regulatory conditions should assist Telstra and other international
carriers to be more competitive:
•  individual country arrangements which allow competition in the provision of
international voice telephony services;
•  individual country arrangements which give freedom and flexibility to international
carriers to commercially negotiate and agree new and innovative international
settlement arrangements;
•  individual country arrangements which require the offering of cost-based domestic
interconnection arrangements that could be used to terminate incoming
international traffic;
•  recommendations and rules covering the setting of accounting or settlement rates
which will drive them closer to cost; and
•  the use of broader regulatory provisions by overseas governments to protect
against anti-competitive conduct.
Rail Access Corporation (sub. D14, p. 2)
[The Corporation] supports the Australian Government in taking steps to ensure that
competitive safeguards are established [at the international level] which first, prevent
the misuse of market power and second, allow domestic and international market
growth based on equitable pricing arrangements.78 INTERNATIONAL
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As DOCITA commented, the ITU accounting rate system will ‘become less and less
prevalent as the number of liberalised markets grows’ (sub.  6, p. 21). This suggests
that the remaining distortions and inefficiencies arising from that system might best
be reduced through encouraging an increase in the number of countries which
pursue liberalisation of their own domestic markets.
The slow pace of institutional change through the ITU, however, raises the issue of
what action Australia can take in the meantime to moderate the remaining
deficiencies of the current accounting rate system.
Pursuing international negotiations and discussions for accounting
rate reform
Reform may be more achievable through the auspices of the WTO than the ITU (see
section 6.7). In this regard, Australia should endeavour to ensure that the
commitment of WTO members to return to the accounting rate issue in the next
round of negotiations is met. Thus, in the lead up to those negotiations, the
Australian Government should continue discussions with other countries, bilaterally
and in regional forums such as APEC, with the aim of resolving deficiencies in the
accounting rate system through actions such as:
•  lowering accounting rates;
•  removing restrictions on differential settlement rates;
•  removing parallel accounting requirements;
•  removing proportionate return requirements; and
•  allowing greater freedom for telecommunications providers to negotiate on
commercial terms and conditions.
In its initial submission, Telstra suggested the Australian Government seek to
negotiate removal of the US’s ‘continued requirements for parallel accounting and
proportionate return’ (sub.  4, p. 18). However, Telstra subs equently advised that:
Given that Australia-US is an approved International Simple Resale (ISR) route and
Telstra operates ISR agreements with USA carriers, we are not subject to the
proportionate return and parallel requirements of the International Settlements Policy
(ISP) [of the FCC]. (Sub. D18, p. 4)
Legitimisation of alternative calling procedures
Irrespective of the pace of reform under the auspices of the ITU or the WTO, the
accounting rate system will continue to be undermined by alternative callingISSUES AND OPTIONS 79
procedures. These include international simple resale (ISR), callback and refile. ISR
and callback are permitted in traffic between some markets, but not all. Although
refile is not permitted under the ITU, it is a common practice in international
telecommunications markets.
DOCITA indicated that the Australian legislative framework permits the provision
and use of these procedures on the basis that they are ‘legitimate commercial
activities that are to be expected and even encouraged in a competitive
telecommunications environment’ (sub.  6, p. 28):
Our position remains that while it may be illegal for a consumer to access alternative
calling services in some countries, it is not illegal for Australia to offer such services as
those services are not illegal in Australia. (Sub.  6, p, 29)
The costs stemming from the accounting rate system could reduce more quickly if
the use of alternative calling procedures were to become even more prevalent. Thus,
an option for Australia would be to seek to increase, through discussion and
negotiation, the number of countries which permit alternative calling procedures.
Removing traffic from the scope of the system
Countries which support continuation of the existing accounting rate system may be
amenable nevertheless to the removal of particular categories of international
telecommunications traffic from its scope. For example, significant volumes of
international traffic originate and/or terminate on mobile networks — yet, as noted
in chapter 3, the accounting rate system makes no allowance for the higher prices
providers pay for mobile interconnection. This can lead to losses by international
providers from such traffic, as well as to arbitrage behaviour such as mobile refile.
Countries which support the accounting rate system in general may lose from its
coverage of treatment of mobile traffic.
An option for Australia in promoting reform would be to seek the complete
separation from the accounting rate system of international traffic originating or
terminating on mobile networks, leaving payments for that traffic entirely to
commercial negotiation. Such action, in regard to mobile and other relevant
categories of traffic, could further ‘chip away at the edges’ of the accounting rate
system, thus hastening fundamental reform.
Reducing scope for anti-competitive conduct
Some monopoly telecommunications providers in non-liberalised markets may
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opportunities to take advantage of providers in liberalised markets such as
Australia’s.
However, no conclusive evidence of anti-competitive behaviour by foreign
providers in the Australian market was presented during the inquiry. Although there
has been one complaint under the Rules of Conduct stemming from the Australian
Telecommunications Act 1997 — these rules are intended to guard against anti-
competitive conduct by international telecommunications providers — no
substantiation was presented by the complainant after a request for information from
the ACCC.
Telstra and the Rail Access Corporation expressed concern about market power in a
broader context. For instance, Telstra commented:
Globalisation and commoditisation of carriage favours consolidation and scale and can
lead to concentrations of market power in vertically and horizontally integrated
corporations. (Sub. 4, p. 20)
However, DOCITA commented that ‘the normal rules on access to facilities and on
anti-competitive conduct will be supervised by the relevant regulators’, and that:
Appeal could also be made under the International Rules of Conduct if the activity of a
global alliance or other relationship were suspected of amounting to ‘unacceptable
conduct’ under those rules. (Sub.  6, p. 32)
At this stage, the Commission has concluded that there would be no benefit in
making the Rules of Conduct more explicit. The ACCC noted that the rules ‘already
provide scope for the application of parallel accounting and proportionate return
requirements if necessary’ (sub.  D20, p. 5). The Commission notes that a revi ew of
Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act, concerning telecommunications anti-
competitive conduct and record keeping rules, is scheduled to be conducted by
1 July 2000. This review could provide a good opportunity for also examining the
effectiveness of the Rules of Conduct under the Telecommunications Act.
Conclusion
Encouraging more countries to pursue liberalisation of their own domestic markets
is considered the best approach to overcoming the distortions and inefficiencies
which the accounting rate system imposes.
Australia could also increase pressure for the institutional reform of the accounting
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•  seeking to ensure that the commitment of WTO members to include negotiations
on the accounting rate system in the WTO round commencing before 2000 is
met;
•  seeking to increase the number of countries which permit alternative calling
procedures;
•  seeking complete removal of particular categories of international traffic, such as
that originating or terminating on mobile networks, from the system; and
•  from time to time reviewing the effectiveness of the Australian Rules of Conduct
for international telecommunications operators in minimising opportunities for
anti-competitive conduct.
6.3 Interconnection
As the institutional arrangements for the accounting rate  system  have begun to
change, greater attention needs to be placed on the  individual elements which go to
make up international telecommunications services: in particular, on the prices of
interconnection with domestic networks and on access to, and the pricing of, cable
and satellite facilities. These elements already feature in payments for much non-
accounting rate traffic.
Domestic interconnection charges at both the originating and terminating ends affect
the total price of international telecommunications. In regard to foreign
interconnection charges, Telstra considered that ‘as many countries as possible ...
[should] regulate for the provision of cost-based domestic interconnection rates’
(sub. 4, p. 17). The Commission endor ses such an approach, both for foreign
countries and Australia.
In regard to its own interconnection rates, Telstra considered that ‘the charges it has
proposed are strictly in line with costs’ (sub.  D17, p. 2).
In contrast, Cable & Wireless Optus contended that (sub.  5, p. 25):
•  Telstra sells to independent competitors at four times the price it sells to its retail
arm;
•  interconnection charges remain at least four times above cost; and
•  domestic regulation is yet to deliver unbundled interconnection charges.
Telstra replied that:
Optus provides a seriously misleading characterisation of the domestic
telecommunications market and a flawed analysis of the impact of domestic interconnect
arrangements on international telecommunications services. (Sub.  D17, p. 10)82 INTERNATIONAL
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The ACCC has found that the interconnection rates offered by Telstra for PSTN
access significantly exceed the costs of an efficient operator.
AAPT and Global One also commented on the importance of pricing for
interconnection and transmission charges. For instance, Global One considered that:
consumer benefits cannot be fully realised and indeed existing benefits remain at risk as
long as Telstra continues to overcharge for domestic interconnection and for other
domestic bottlenecks and delays and/or games bottleneck service provision. (Sub.  13,
p. 3)
In its Position Paper, the Commission stated that, given the expected rapid fall in
transmission costs and prices, interconnection is assuming more importance in the
total cost equation. In this environment, the economic costs from any inefficient
interconnection pricing would also become increasingly high.
AAPT supported the Commission’s contention (sub.  D15, p. 1). Telstra, however,
contended that ‘the level of domestic PSTN access charges can have virtually no
impact on IDD rates’. It stated that, based on information presented by Cable &
Wireless Optus, a reduction in the interconnection charge from 4.7 cents per minute
to 1 cent per minute would at most reduce international call prices by 3 to 5 per cent
(sub. D17, p. 2). In this regard, the Commission notes that:
•  The Optus data used by Telstra relate to 1998 but, since then, prices have
declined significantly. Telstra itself indicated that its traffic-weighted price per
IDD minute decreased by 72 per cent in the year to May 1999. Thus, the relative
importance of any given interconnection rate could have more than tripled in the
last year. Similarly, the relative importance of a reduction in those rates would
also have increased markedly to about 10 to 18 per cent.
•  The importance of interconnection charges in comparison to the underlying  cost
of international telecommunications is much higher that in comparison to the
retail price, as estimated by Telstra.
The Commission reaffirms the growing importance of interconnection charges and
the importance of cost-based interconnection pricing. The Commission also
considers that:
•  an excessively high interconnection price may deter entry of new carriage
service providers of international telecommunications services, or even
encourage wasteful duplication of domestic network facilities;
•  given the relatively price sensitivity of demand for international
telecommunications services, there should be relatively little recovery of
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traffic — in practice, it is likely to be more efficient to recover most of these
costs elsewhere; and
•  with data and other traffic where volume (bandwidth use) is more significant,
including the Internet, it could be more efficient to base the charges for
interconnection between international and domestic networks on other than a per
minute basis, for example according to capacity utilisation.
Although the above discussion concentrates on the interconnection of international
traffic with domestic fixed line networks, it is also important for the interconnection
rates for origination or termination of international traffic on mobile networks to be
set efficiently. AAPT considered that the ‘current interconnection charges of all
three mobile carriers in Australia are significantly above cost’ (sub.  D15, p. 2).
6.4 Transmission facilities
There is some evidence to suggest that access to transmission facilities has been
difficult and expensive for some Australian providers, relative to the access
available to Telstra and Cable & Wireless Optus (see section 4.4). The reasons for
this include capacity constraints, especially in a time of growing demand for traffic
including Internet traffic, as well as the exercise of ownership rights in setting
prices.
Despite past deficiencies, there is evidence that market developments themselves
will achieve a better outcome over time. Earlier chapters report the growing
investment in cable, including to Australia, with significant investment by non-
carriers. Access to new cables is likely to be available not just to well-established
carriers, but also to new competitors and service providers. With continuing
technological change, the underlying costs of cable usage are falling rapidly.
In the meantime, providers with concerns about access to transmission facilities for
international telecommunications — for example, the half circuits ‘owned’ by
Australian carriers such as Telstra and Cable & Wireless Optus — could raise these
with the ACCC either by:
•  seeking to make an ‘unacceptable conduct’ case under the Rules of Conduct for
international telecommunications operators; and/or
•  seeking to have the relevant facilities ‘declared’ by the ACCC (see box 1.1).
In its submission (sub.  10, p. 11), the ACCC stated that it had not considered
whether to declare infrastructure facilities or cable directly relating to international
telecommunications services. Such a declaration could only follow an ACCC public84 INTERNATIONAL
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inquiry process, or the recommendation of the Telecommunications Access Forum
(sub. 10, p. 10). In considering possible declaration, the ACCC would need to
balance a range of factors, including the likelihood of a market-based solution to
any access problems developing in the relatively short term as noted above.
PanAmSat, the world’s largest privately owned satellite operator, raised two issues
of concern in relation to its Australian operations. It stated that:
•  the international revenue of international satellite carriers is included in the
arrangements for the calculation of the Universal Service Obligation (USO)
contribution, whereas the revenue of international submarine cable consortia is
not included; and
•  preferential regulatory treatment is accorded to the international satellite
consortia, INTELSAT and Inmarsat. (Sub. 9, p. 1)
Each of these practices, if substantiated, would appear to be inequitable or
inefficient.
In regard to the first, a USO liability arises for PanAmSat because it holds an
Australian carrier licence. However, PanAmSat needs to be licensed not because it
provides international services, but because it provides  domestic carriage services.
In contrast, the international cable consortia do not provide  domestic carriage
services, and thus do not need to be licensed as carriers and contribute to the USO
for providing essentially the same services as PanAmSat. This situation appears
anomalous. DOCITA has been reviewing the USO regime and considering issues
like the one raised by PanAmSat.
In regard to the second point, the Commission considers that, in principle,
regulatory arrangements should not discriminate against particular providers solely
on the basis of whether their ownership is public or private. Also, this is contrary to
the competitive neutrality principle under National Competition Policy.
In summary, enhanced access to, and lower pricing of, transmission facilities is
likely to be achieved through market developments. However, the Rules of Conduct
of the Telecommunications Act and/or the access provisions of the Trade Practices
Act provide possible remedies for providers in the shorter term.
6.5 Pricing of Internet traffic
US ISPs are currently taking advantage of their market power to ensure that
Australian providers pay the full cost (both ways) of Internet international
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port charges to access the Internet in the United States, while US providers obtain
access to the Internet in Australia without paying port charges here.
Such use of market power disadvantages Australian providers (and ultimately
consumers) relative to a situation of greater competition. This is not to say that, with
greater competition, Australia and the United States would pay  equal shares. As
Telstra indicated:
it is probably appropriate to acknowledge that for Australia, use of and hence benefit
from Internet connection to the US is higher than that from the US to Australia ...
(Sub. 4, pp. 14–15)
However, in a competitive market, the United States would pay at least  some of the
cost.
The question of Internet pricing is under study and discussion in many different
forums, including the OECD, APEC, WTO and the ITU. For example, APEC is
undertaking studies into ‘International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services’
and the provision of Internet bandwidth and access in the Asia-Pacific. Also,
Australia has proposed that the issue be included in the forthcoming round of WTO
negotiations.
In aiming at a more competitive international Internet market, an issue is whether
market forces will themselves solve the ‘problem’ or whether government
intervention is needed. Although the Internet has been dominated by the United
States until now:
•  it is relatively new and non-US originated content is likely to grow in relative
importance over time;
•  even in the US market, pricing for Internet services is moving away from peering
towards cost-based provision; and
•  non-US carriers are taking steps to increase their own market power. For
example, as noted in box 2.3, Telstra is extending its Internet capacity to the
United States and, together with a group of regional carriers, is establishing an
Internet router at the Palo Alto Internet exchange.
Changes such as these should put market pressure on US providers to contribute to
more of the international Internet costs. Indeed, US interests have argued that the
market will provide a solution. In a background paper to the APEC
telecommunications working group, the United States stated:
Where concerns over commercial arrangements to provide Internet services may exist,
regulators should let the private sector develop commercial responses. During this time
of rapid telecommunications liberalisation and technology innovation, the United States
believes that cost efficient arrangements for Internet traffic will continue to be worked86 INTERNATIONAL
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out most quickly if the market is not hampered by government regulation. Unnecessary
regulation could stifle the global development and expansion of Internet infrastructure
and services. (APEC 1999b, p.  1)
Australia has not been content to wait for market forces, and has been encouraging
international discussions on the issue. DOCITA stated that:
Australia’s objective ... will not favour direct interventionist regulation, but will
encourage application of appropriate market disciplines to balance the substantial market
power of the most developed economies. (Sub.  6, p. 23)
Australia has proposed an Internet charging model which ‘should serve the needs of
all stakeholders based upon equitable distribution of costs and benefits, including
return on investment’ (APEC 1999c, p.  1).
In the Commission’s view, it is appropriate that the Australian Government pursue
international action to speed up implementation of appropriate market-based
Internet payment arrangements. Even though such arrangements might ultimately
develop without government discussion and negotiation, delay could cause the
current excess cost to Australia — estimated by Telstra at some $40-70 million per
annum — to grow rapidly in line with growth in household and business use of the
Internet.
The Commission therefore endorses the approach of the Australian Government in
seeking international discussions on reforming Internet payment arrangements, to
give added momentum to market forces. The pro-competitive principles contained in
the WTO Reference Paper relating to basic telecommunications services could serve
as a useful input into those discussions.
6.6 Passing on the benefits from reform
The evidence available to the Commission during this inquiry argues strongly that
the liberalisation of telecommunications markets, domestically and internationally,
has brought significant benefits for users, particularly in respect of voice calls at the
retail level.
One area where some doubt was expressed relates to the extent to which these
benefits have been passed on to businesses which require bandwidth and data
services. The Australian Telecommunications Users Group advised that:
one additional issue of significance is the failure of most carriers to lower the price of
dedicated links or data services in line with underlying cost reductions and with the
declining cost of international call charges. (Sub.  3, p. 3)ISSUES AND OPTIONS 87
Further, telecommunications tariff structures are often not particularly transparent,
frequently bundling services together in different combinations, making it difficult
for business users to shop around for the best deal.
In response, Telstra disagreed with ATUG’s claim as:
the price of dedicated links or data services has been lower [about half] than
international call charges … Competition by its nature has resulted in a reduction in
prices of international calls and international private leases [for dedicated links and data
services] … (Sub. D19, p. 2)
The Commission notes that the ACCC monitors and  publicly reports annually on
charges paid by consumers. It has published its first such report, concentrating on
Telstra’s charges, and intends to increase the scope of future price reporting to
progressively cover a range of additional carriers and services (ACCC 1998d).
In the Position Paper, the Commission commented that, while a competitive market
is still developing, there is a role for the ACCC to publish publicly relevant
information. Telstra expressed ‘puzzlement and disappointment’ at this comment,
claiming that the large reductions in international call prices over the last five years
‘was not brought about by increased regulation — rather, it was the result of
reducing the extent of regulatory restraint’ (sub.  D17, p. 7). Telstra noted that an
Industry Commission 1997 staff information paper had concluded that:
given the increasing incentive for tacit collusion as switched service providers’ market
share increases, it may not be desirable for the ACCC to publish tariffs supplied to it
upon request. Standard competition policy safeguards alone may be a more effective
means of preventing anti-competitive pricing. (IC1997a, p.  42)
However, since that staff paper was finalised, over 25 new carriers have entered the
Australian market, together with many more carriage service providers. In the
Commission’s view, any danger of tacit collusion would be now minimal and would
be further reduced as the scope of ACCC monitoring and reporting expands.
Further, the main rationale for public price reporting is to inform prospective
purchasers of the range of service options and prices available in a market of rapid
change, but still limited transparency.
In the Commission’s view, providers could be encouraged to pass on more of the
benefits of reform to other service providers and to business users if the ACCC were
to extend its public reporting further than proposed — for example, it could include
the  prices paid by users for dedicated lines and data services. The ACCC
commented that it would consider the extent to which leased lines and data services
meet its criteria for extending its price monitoring: relative importance, extent of
substitutes and degree of policy concern (sub.  D20, p. 3). Still greater pressure
would be put on providers to pass on reform benefits if more information about the88 INTERNATIONAL
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underlying costs of provision of international telecommunications were also made
readily available publicly.
The Commission is aware that reporting requirements impose compliance costs on
the telecommunications industry. However, a recent draft report from the ACCC —
Record Keeping Rules for the Telecommunications Industry, issued for comment in
June 1999 (ACCC 1999c) — proposes that carriers be required to report to the
ACCC on a range of revenue, cost and capital information. The ACCC indicated
that the draft rules encompass wholesale international long distance and wholesale
international leased lines (sub.  D20, p. 3). The purpose of such reporting is to
strengthen the ACCC’s ability to investigate anti-competitive behaviour and
determine appropriate access prices. Such reporting could form a base from which
to draw appropriate information to publish  publicly without imposing still further
additional compliance costs on telecommunications providers.
6.7 Negotiating internationally
The Commission supports an international negotiating stance which builds on
Australia’s own record to embrace bilateral and regional support for further market
liberalisation. With this support, Australia can hope to exert greater influence in
multilateral forums. To this extent, the Commission endorses the comments of
DOCITA that:
The principal strategy for change is to exert influence in the multilateral processes that
set the global regulatory environment, by building on regional and bilateral alliances with
governments that share common objectives with Australia. (Sub.  6, p. 20)
DOCITA has summarised Australia’s objectives in these negotiations (sub.  6,
pp. 20, 37):
•  The next round of WTO GATS negotiations should result in recognition of
telecommunications termination services as traded services that are subject to the
standard GATS disciplines of transparency and non-discrimination, including
National Treatment and MFN.
•  The ITU should modify its basic instruments so that the International
Telecommunications Regulations appropriately reflect the role of governments in
promoting open and competitive markets for international telecommunications
services.
•  Equivalent market-based principles as are applied to conventional
telecommunications should be applied to the telecommunications elements of
Internet services, with emphasis on light-touch, industry self-regulation and a
minimum of new or specific regulation.ISSUES AND OPTIONS 89
•  The principle of technology neutrality should be observed wherever possible in
the framing of regulation, so that regulation can be robust in the face of
continuing development of telecommunications and information technology.
•  The Australian Government should reserve sufficient powers to intervene where
necessary to protect competition in the Australian market or other matters of
significant national interest.
DFAT also noted:
DFAT and Austrade will ... continue to make efforts in bilateral, regional and
multilateral forums as appropriate to enhance Australian industry’s capacity to develop
further telecommunications goods and services exports. (Sub.  11, p. 8)
Telstra emphasised the need for multilateral initiatives to bring prices closer to costs
in all countries, not just those which have already liberalised:
the Australian Government [should] support multilateral regulatory initiatives intended
to force accounting rates closer to costs, but only provided that such initiatives could be
guaranteed to force rates closer to genuine costs across  all types of countries. It is
important to make clear that it would be inappropriate to support initiatives which
would force settlement rates paid to already liberalised countries, such as Australia, even
closer to genuine costs thus perpetuating the present inequities. (Sub.  4, p. 17)
In the light of the benefits arising from Australia’s own market liberalisation, the
Commission considers that the most urgent reform priority is to pursue further
market liberalisation across all countries with remaining barriers to effective
competition. This objective is clearly best pursued through the WTO — further
negotiations are scheduled to commence by 2000. In terms of payment arrangements
in particular, a reform program was not included in the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications. WTO members have agreed to return to the accounting rate
issue in these further negotiations.
Australia is also continuing to pursue change through the ITU, even though,
according to DOCITA, the ‘processes for achieving change are treaty-based,
cumbersome, and take several years to accomplish even where there is a strong
consensus for change’ (sub.  6, p. 20).
DOCITA (sub. 6, p. 39) noted a number of specific concerns that Australia has with
the ITU (also see appendix A.) For example, a number of the Articles of the ITRs, if
fully observed, restrict the development of competition, support monopolies and
require inappropriate levels of government intervention. Further, application of
certain Articles could cause countries which have liberalised their markets to act in




In noting that if the ITU rejects change at the next scheduled opportunity (2002 at
the earliest for the next world conference of ITU members), ‘advanced
telecommunications economies ... will probably cease to recognise the authority of
the ITU’, DOCITA commented that ‘this would be a regrettable outcome for
Australia, because Australia relies on authoritative multilateral fora such as the ITU
to moderate the market power of our largest trading partners’ (sub.  6, p. 20).
However, DOCITA also noted that ‘in reality, the WTO GATS commitments
provide an acceptable alternative for liberalised and liberalising economies that are
WTO members’ (sub. 6, p. 21).
Bilateral and plurilateral discussions would also prove useful in clarifying issues
and in agenda setting for the forthcoming WTO negotiations. In APEC, Australia
could continue to argue the case for market liberalisation and the freeing up of
payment arrangements, including for the Internet. APEC is already undertaking
significant work in this regard. As DFAT commented:
The APEC Telecommunications Working Group, established in 1990, has made
significant progress in establishing a framework for liberalised trade in
telecommunications in the Asia-Pacific region. (Sub.  11, p. 5)
DFAT also noted the value of bilateral agreements, particularly in regard to the
development of information technology industries and electronic commerce:
These [bilateral collaborative] agreements [with Singapore and Hong Kong], which have
a strong focus on trade and investment, establish formal communication channels with
major players in the emerging information economy and will enable us to maintain
dialogues on international telecommunications and information technology issues.
(Sub. 11, p. 4)
Realistically, Australia does not have the market power to endeavour to force
change unilaterally. It must rely on building up spheres of influence. In this regard,
Telstra considered that Australia’s negotiating position with those many countries
critical of the US FCC’s current unilateral approach would be enhanced if it
indicated disapproval:
the Australian Government’s interactions and negotiations with these other countries
would likely be enhanced if it were to clearly indicate its disagreement with the FCC’s
continuing restrictive approach ... (Sub.  4, p. 18)
The Commission notes that ‘while sympathetic to the FCC’s objectives, DOCITA
has expressed concern that this action [ie the FCC’s unilateral price benchmarks]
may damage the multilateral arrangements ...’ (sub.  6, p. 24).
In conclusion, the Commission supports the thrust of Australia’s international
negotiating positions in regard to telecommunications. Achieving further
liberalisation of domestic markets is the most urgent reform need — this objective isISSUES AND OPTIONS 91
best mainly pursued through the WTO. It is also important for WTO members to
recommence negotiations on issues relating to the accounting rate system. There is




A International regulatory change
Over the past decade, international telecommunications markets have been subject
to extensive regulatory change at both the multilateral and unilateral levels. This
appendix describes three processes of particular significance:
•  market liberalisation reforms pursued multilaterally by the World Trade
Organization (WTO);
•  changes to the accounting rate system pursued  multilaterally by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU); and
•  the attempts by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to force
change to the accounting rate system  unilaterally.
A.1 World Trade Organization
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is the first multilateral
agreement to subject services to rules aimed at liberalising trade with enforcement
through an agreed dispute settlement mechanism.
Obligations under the GATS relate to, among others, most favoured nation
treatment (which prohibits Members from discriminating between themselves),
market access (which prohibits restrictions such as on the number of service
providers or on participation of foreign capital), transparency and national treatment
(which prohibits Members from discriminating in favour of national providers).
Additional obligations in relation to access to and use of ‘public
telecommunications transport networks and services’ are contained in the GATS
Annex on Telecommunications.
Although the GATS represents a significant step forward, a major structural
weakness is that market access and national treatment obligations only apply to
those services identified by Members in their schedules of ‘specific commitments’.
Most Members preferred either to make unbound (or no) commitments or to bind
the current situation, including existing regulatory impediments. Most also chose
not to list many important services.  94 INTERNATIONAL
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In relation to telecommunications services, many Members’ schedules of specific
commitments included ‘enhanced telecommunications services’ such as electronic
mail, voice mail, on-line information, electronic data interchange and value added
facsimile services, but did not include ‘basic telecommunications services’ such as
voice telephone, telex, telegraph and private leased circuit services.   
In negotiating the GATS, a decision was taken to extend negotiations on basic
telecommunications services on a voluntary basis.   These negotiations concluded
three years later in February 1997 with what is commonly referred to as the
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT). The ABT, which came into force
on 5 February 1998, consists essentially of the scheduled commitments of
participating Members in regard to basic telecommunications services. 1 These
commitments cover market access (including foreign direct investment), national
treatment and pro-competitive regulation (such as competition safeguards,
interconnection guarantees, transparent licensing processes and the independence of
regulators).
As of November 1998, 75 countries (more than half the total WTO membership, the
EU counting as one) had submitted scheduled commitments on basic
telecommunications services (WTO 1998a, p. 6). 2 They include developed countries
such as in the European Union, Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, Hong
Kong and Singapore and developing countries such as Korea, Brazil, Argentina,
India and Turkey. For many Members, such as Australia, the United Kingdom and
the United States, the ABT locked in pre-existing unilateral reforms. However, for
others, the ABT implied substantial additional market liberalisation.   Table A.1
summarises the scheduled commitments (and exemptions to most favoured nation
treatment) of WTO Members representing Australia’s major telecommunications
destinations.
An important outcome of the negotiations on basic telecommunications was the
development of a set of pro-competitive regulatory principles, known as the
Reference Paper. It is legally binding for the 57 Members (including Australia)
which have agreed to accept it. It covers regulatory issues which have an important
bearing on competitive conditions including interconnection, spectrum allocation
and competitive safeguards.
                                            
1 The schedules are annexed to the Fourth Protocol to the GATS.
2  By the February 1997 deadline for the negotiations, 69 countries (the European Union counting
as one) submitted scheduled commitments. These countries represented 93 per cent of world









Although it is an impediment to market access, the accounting rate system was not
covered by the ABT. During negotiations, participating Members raised concerns
about the effect of most favoured nation treatment on differential settlement rates,
developing country issues such as foreign exchange payments under the present
system and whether settlement rates are the result of commercial negotiations or are
regulatory measures (Ovum 1998, p. 110). The WTO has delayed further discussion
on the accounting rate system until the next round of GATS negotiations expected
to begin by 2000.
A.2 International Telecommunications Union
The ITU was originally formed in 1865 to administer the International Telegraph
Convention, which was signed by 20 participating countries. The Convention
included rules to standardise equipment for interconnection and international tariff
and accounting rules. The ITU, which consists currently of 188 Member States and
Sector Members, has no power to enforce its recommendations — these need to be
adopted by national governments to have effect. In contrast, the International
Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) which, in the main, cover the general
principles relating to settlement arrangements are binding on Member States.
The ITU has been seeking changes to the accounting rate system since the early
1990s. Work has been pursued through Study Group 3 of the ITU
Telecommunication Standardisation Sector, which is responsible for tariff and
accounting principles in international telecommunications. Study Group 3’s work
has focused on:
•  driving accounting rate levels closer to costs; and
•  new methods for remunerating providers for call termination.
Some ITU members, who have pursued liberalised market policies, consider that
there are some problems with the ITRs in view of the changed structure and
operation of global telecommunications. These regulations can only be amended at a
world conference of ITU members which was last done in 1988. The ITU
Plenipotentiary conference agreed that an expert group be set up at a meeting in




Box A.1 International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The ITU comprises governments (Member States) and the private sector (Sector
Members). Telecommunication standardisation study groups study particular issues
referred to them and prepare draft recommendations. These must be submitted for
approval to the World Telecommunication Standardisation Conference, or to
administrations by correspondence.
International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs), for the most part, concern
international telecommunications settlements. The ITRs were last amended at the
1988 World Conference. These regulations can only be amended at a world
conference of ITU members, currently known as the World International
Telecommunication Conference.
The Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU in November 1998, in recognition of some
potential problems with the ITRs, agreed that an expert group be set up to:
•  study the roles and responsibilities of Member States and Sector Members
regarding the regulation and operation of international telecommunications
services;
•  consider the wider multilateral treaty obligations that may affect the regulation of
international telecommunications; and
•  review the extent to which the current needs of Member States are reflected in the
basic instruments of the Union and in particular the ITRs.
An expert group of 20 members was set up at the ITU Council meeting in June 1999,
with a report due by June 2000.
Source: DOCITA (sub. 6); ITU (http://www.itu/newsroom/press/releases/1999/NP-6.html).
Accounting rate levels
A key development was Recommendation D.140 (Accounting Rate Principles for
International Telephone Services) which was agreed to by ITU Member States in
1992. This Recommendation provided for accounting rates to be cost-based, non-
discriminatory and transparent within five years. However, it has been subject to
two further revisions: in 1995, Annex C set out two possible approaches to
negotiating accounting rates and, in 1998, Annex D established a ceiling on the total
accounting rate of 1 SDR per minute (excluding transit charges) to be achieved by
the end of 1998.  
A focus group attached to Study Group 3 was established in 1998 to propose
‘transitional arrangements towards cost-orientation beyond 1998, including ranges
of indicative target rates’.   In its final report, the focus group proposed a new Annex




which varied according to teledensity (see table  A.2) as well as transition periods
(see table A.3). The target settlement rates were derived for each relevant
teledensity from the average of the lowest 20 per cent of published settlement rates.
The revised text of the proposed new Annex was considered at the Study Group 3’s
June 1999 meeting, with a majority of administrations supporting the draft. It will
be submitted for approval at the December 1999 meeting.
Table A.2 ITU focus group’s proposals on target settlement rates
Teledensity
range









SDR per minute US cents per
minute
T> 50 Australia, Canada, Denmark,




35 < T £ 50 Austria, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
New Zealand, Singapore, Spain
0.088 11.8
20 < T £ 35 Bahamas, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Uruguay
0.118 15.8
10 < T £ 20 Argentina, Chile, Iran, Malaysia,
Russia, South Africa
0.162 21.6
5 < T £ 10 Bolivia, China, Egypt, Mexico, Peru,
Thailand, Uzbekistan
0.210 28.0
1 < T £ 5 Albania, Cuba, India, Indonesia,
Philippines, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe
0.251 33.5
T £ 1 Afghanistan, Angola, Cameroon,
DPR Congo, Liberia, Nigeria
0.327 43.7.
a These are only a selection of countries falling within the relevant teledensity range.
Source:  ITU (1998, pp. 5, 7-13); Hill (1998, p. 7).
Table A.3 ITU focus group’s proposals on transition periods for target
settlement rates
Net settlement payments (NSP) relative to total
telecommunications revenue (TTR)
Target year for achieving target settlement rate
NSP < 10 per cent TTR Year end 2001
10 per cent TTR < NSP < 20 per cent TTR Year end 2002
20 per cent TTR < NSP < 30 per cent TTR Year end 2003
NSP > 30 per cent TTR Year end 2004




Study Group 3 has recently completed work on methods for remunerating providers.
A draft revised Recommendation D.150 (New System for Accounting in
International Telephony) containing three methods of remuneration, including
termination charges, was submitted to ITU Member States in February 1999 for
approval. Recommendation D.150 was approved and became operational from 15
June 1999.
Australia’s concerns with the International Telecommunications
Regulations of the ITU
DOCITA’s concerns are that a number of Articles in the International
Telecommunications Regulations, if fully observed, have the effect of restricting the
development of competition, supporting monopolies and requiring inappropriate
levels of government intervention in telecommunications markets. For example:
•  Article 3.3 requires that a direct route must be used where it exists between two
administrations, even if it is not the most efficient route or the route preferred by
both administrations. However, this Article limits the ability of carriers or transit
operators to compete for international telephony business by offering alternative
(indirect) international routes at cheaper prices.
•  Article 6.1.2 requires that ‘the charge levied by an administration on customers
for a particular communications should in principle be the same in a given
relation, regardless of the route chosen by that Administration.’ This Article
provides no incentive for an Administration to choose, or agree to, the least
expensive routes. DOCITA considers that this is anti-competitive and
inconsistent with any contemporary practice of commercial traffic management.
•  Appendix 1 generally results in there being no cost-related basis to the rates
charged for the use of a particular route, or the differences in cost between
different routes. It does not reflect the actual commercial practice of dynamic
traffic management that is in everyday use. (Sub. 6, pp. 39–40)
A.3 Federal Communications Commission
Throughout the 1990s, the FCC has unilaterally implemented changes to the
accounting rate system as it applies to US providers. These changes also have an




The United States has been largely motivated by concerns about the large  above
cost subsidy — estimated by the FCC to be at least $US3.7 billion — from US
consumers to foreign providers.   Hence, the changes focused on reducing settlement
rates towards cost. However, many of them were intended to introduce greater
competition in the US telecommunications market and reinforce anti-competitive
safeguards. The changes are described below in chronological order.
In 1986, the FCC introduced its International Settlements Policy (ISP) to prevent
foreign monopoly providers from ‘whipsawing’ US providers. The ISP required
uniform and equally divided accounting rates, non-discriminatory treatment of US
providers and proportionate return of traffic.
In 1991, the FCC allowed US providers to resell their international private lines to
provide switched services to countries that afford equivalent resale opportunities
(known as the FCC’s private line resale policy).
In 1992, the FCC issued its first order on settlement rate benchmarks. US providers
were required to reduce their settlement rates to between: SDR 0.275 and 0.42 for
US-Asia relations; and SDR 0.165 and 0.275 for US-Europe relations.   The order
also streamlined some of the procedures imposed on these providers to reduce their
accounting rates and introduced some flexibility in the ISP by allowing settlement
rates to differ if justified by differences in costs.
In January 1996, the FCC announced its Accounting Rate Policy Statement which
represented a significant change in its approach to settlement rates. It expanded
beyond its private line resale policy to endorse new services in the international
telecommunications market. It also pledged to tailor its settlement rate policies to
reflect different market structures; that is, monopoly or highly concentrated markets,
effectively competitive markets and developing countries’ markets.   
In December 1996, the FCC introduced its Flexibility Order to introduce greater
flexibility in its ISP. The Order allowed US providers to negotiate payment
arrangements which deviated from the uniform settlement rate and proportionate
return requirements with foreign providers from countries open to competition.
In August 1997, the FCC issued an Order which revised its 1992 benchmark
settlement rates to reflect cost reductions due to recent technological improvements
and structural changes occurring in the international telecommunications market.
The benchmarks are 15 US cents per minute for high income countries, 19 US cents
per minute for middle income countries, and 23 US cents per minute for low income
countries (see table A.4). The benchmarks are to be phased in over transition
periods. If foreign providers were not willing to agree to these benchmark rates in102 INTERNATIONAL
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the specified time period, the FCC may direct US providers to withhold any
payment above them.
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a Income is defined as GNP per capita. b These are only a selection of countries falling within the relevant
income/teledensity range.
Source:   FCC (1997).
The 1997 Order also addressed competitive distortions in the US market such as one
way bypass.
•  To prevent one way bypass, the FCC may permit a provider to provide switched
services over international private lines only if at least half of the traffic on the
route is settled at rates that are at or below the relevant benchmark in table A.4.
If it finds that one way bypass is occurring, the FCC can take enforcement action
which may include a requirement that US providers be prohibited from using
their authorisations to provide switched services over private lines on a given
route until settlement rates for at least half the traffic on that route are at or




•  To prevent a US provider from using a foreign affiliate’s above benchmark
settlement rate revenues to gain an ‘unfair’ price advantage over other US
providers, the FCC may require that the foreign affiliate charges a settlement rate
that is at or below the applicable benchmark rate. This enforcement action may
include a requirement that the settlement rates of the foreign affiliate be reduced
to the ‘best practices’ rate as a condition of continued service on that route from
the US market.
A comparison of the FCC and ITU’s benchmark settlement rates is given in figure
A.1. Some significant differences are apparent, although the full effect of this could
only be assessed in the context of the balance of traffic flows to particular countries.


















































































































Data source: Tables A.2 and A.4.
In April 1999, the FCC issued an Order reforming its ISP.  The Order was intended
to bring the rules in the ISP in line with recent liberalisation in international
telecommunications markets. Specifically, the FCC:
•  eliminated the ISP and contract filing requirements for arrangements with
foreign providers that lack market power;
•  eliminated the ISP for arrangements with all providers on routes where rates to
terminate US calls are at least 25 per cent lower than the relevant settlement rate
benchmark previously adopted by the FCC in 1997 (see table A.4);104 INTERNATIONAL
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•  adopted changes to contract filing requirements to permit US carriers to file
arrangements on a confidential basis with foreign providers with market power
on routes where the ISP is removed;
•  adopted procedural changes to simplify accounting rate filing requirements; and
•  eliminated the flexibility policy (largely superfluous because of the above
reforms to the ISP).
The FCC presumes that a foreign provider does not possess market power on the
foreign end of a US international route if it possesses less than 50 per cent market
share in each of the following foreign product markets: international transport
facilities including cable landing station access and backhaul facilities; intercity
facilities and services; and local facilities and services. It issued a list recently which
identified foreign providers which do not qualify for this presumption (and are thus
still subject to the ISP). Telstra was identified as a foreign provider having market
power in Australia (FCC 1999c, p. 1). However, Telstra has indicated that as there
is an approved International Simple Resale route between Australia and the United
States, it is not subject to the proportional return and parallel accounting
requirements of the International Settlements Policy and can file its call rates
















15 (UK) Commits to complete liberalisation of basic telecommunications services across the EC for all market segments. Also covers, for
example, satellite networks and services and all mobile and personal communications services and systems.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
New
Zealand
12 Commits to open markets for all basic telecommunication services for all market segments.
Under a national treatment limitation, no single foreign entity is permitted to hold more than 49.9 per cent of Telecom New 
does not limit the overall foreign shareholding in that operator.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
United
States
11 Commits to open markets for essentially all basic telecommunication services for all market segments including unrestricted access to
common carrier radio licences for operators that are indirectly foreign owned. Also covers, for example, satellite based services, cellular
telephony and other mobile services. Removal of restrictions on the landing of submarine cable.
Limitations on market access include no issuance of radio licences to operators with more than 20 per cent direct foreign ownership
and Comsat retains exclusive rights to links with Intelsat and  Inmarsat satellite capacity.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
Submits a most favoured nation treatment exemption list on telecommunications services involving one way satellite transmission of
DTH and DBS television services and digital audio services.
Singapore 4 Commits to phase in of competition in facilities-based telecommunication services in April 2000 when up to two additional operators
will be licensed; additional licences will be granted thereafter. Offers open markets for mobile data, cellular telephony and 
services and for paging services after April 2000. Commits to the provision of domestic and international resale of public switched
capacity (not including the connection of leased lines to public networks) for most basic services, including voice, data and ISDN.
Foreign equity limited to 49 per cent for facilities based supply. Indirect investment of up to a total of 74 per cent allowed.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
Hong Kong 4 Commits to international simple resale for facsimile and data transmission services. Already provides access to the local market for
many basic telecommunications services including voice and data transmission as well as mobile radio telephone and mobile data
services. For local fixed network services, four licences already issued and the issuance of further licences will be given consideration in
June 1998. Hong Kong Telecom’s monopoly on international services to expire in 2006. Commits to permit 
alternative international calling services, certain satellite services, virtual private networks and mobile satellite services.









Key aspects of scheduled commitments
Japan 3 Allows participation in international simple resale of voice services.
In April 1996, agreed to remove long standing foreign equity limits on Type I carriers and radio based services, leaving only two
companies KDD and NTT with foreign equity limits at 20 per cent. Aside from these company specific restrictions, open market access
is committed in all market segments for basic telecommunications services (facilities based and resale).
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
Indonesia 3 Will delete an economic needs test for new entrants in domestic mobile cellular telephone services, personal mobile cellular
communication services and regional and national paging services. Public voice telephony, circuit switched public data network and
teleconferencing services currently supplied by a number of suppliers with exclusive rights. Commits to a policy review to determine
whether to admit additional suppliers upon the expiry of the exclusive rights: exclusivity expires in 2011 for local service; in 2006 for
long distance service; and in 2005 for international service. Offers competition for packet switched public data network services, telex,
telegraph and Internet access services, subject to use of networks of  Indosat and Satelindo for international traffic. Offers competition
in domestic mobile cellular telephone services, paging, public payphone services.
Foreign equity limited to 35 per cent for all services except personal communication services which require joint venture with state
owned company.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
China 3 Not relevant.
Malaysia 3 Offers the opportunity to acquire foreign equity in existing facilities based public telecommunications operators. Services supplied by
the existing operators include voice telephony (wire or wireless), data transmission, private leased circuit services, domestic and
international satellite services and satellite links/capacity, satellite earth stations, terrestrial and satellite based mobile services and
video transport services.
Foreign shareholding of up to 30 per cent is permitted in these operators.
Commits to most regulatory principles in the Reference Paper.
Canada 3 Offers a liberalised regime for resale-based competition in local telephone services and in most other basic telecommunications
services. Telesat Canada’s exclusive rights on satellite facilities and earth station serving US/Canada market will be eliminated after
March 2000. Removed from 1 October 1998, restriction on obtaining licences to land submarine cables. Maintains a few limitations on
market access for telephone service in certain cities or Provinces.
Commits to phasing out certain routing restrictions and foreign equity limits on many services by the year 2000.  Removes a
requirement that Canadian equity holding in mobile satellite systems must equal Canadian usage levels. Limits foreign equity in all
facilities-based suppliers to 20 per cent direct and 46.7 per cent combined direct and indirect foreign ownership. 
on overseas (non US) facilities-based service will be eliminated and its foreign equity limits will be raised to 46.7 per cent after October
1998.
Commits to the Reference Paper on regulatory principles.
Source:  WTO (1998b); TeleGeography (1998, p. 159); DFAT (sub. 11, Annex A).PARTICIPATION IN
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B Participation in the inquiry
Submissions




Australian Communications Authority 7
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission  10, D20
Australian Information Industry Association 2
Australian Telecommunications Users Group 3
Cable and Wireless Optus 5
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 6
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 11
Global One Communications 13
PanAmSat 9
Public Interest Advocacy Centre 1
Rail Access Corporation D14
Telstra 4, 8, 12, D16, D17, D18, D19
Public hearing
To receive comment on the Position Paper, a public hearing was held in Sydney on
21 July 1999. The following participated in the hearing:
Telstra
Rail Access Corporation
Informal discussions and visits





Australian Competition and Consumer Commission106 INTERNATIONAL
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Australian Information Industry Association (joint meeting including a representative of the
National Bandwidth Inquiry secretariat)
Australian Telecommunications Users Group
Cable & Wireless Optus
Communications Research Unit (of DOCITA)
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts*
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*
EQUANT
Henry Ergas and Tony Warren
Hutchison Telecoms
P & O Australia
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